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ABSTRACT 
This  paper reviews t h e  causes  of  t h e  s t e e p  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  e s c a l a t i o n  
s i n c e  1978 and t h e  p e r s i s t e n c e  of h igh  r a t e s  du r ing  t h e  r e c e n t  r e c e s s i o n  and 
r e v i v a l .  F i n a n c i a l  i nnova t ion ,  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  v o l a t i l i t y ,  and i n f l a t i o n a r y  
e x p e c t a t i o n s  a l l  p l ay  a  r o l e .  However, t h e  p r i n c i p a l  cause i s  t h e  combination 
of  expansionary f i s c a l  p o l i c y  wi th  r e s t r i c t i v e  monetary po l i cy .  
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S r n l A R Y  
High i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  b i a s  n a t i o n a l  e x p e n d i t u r e  away from i n v e s t m e n t  
and n e t  e x p o r t s ,  c r e a t i n g  a  danger  o f  f u t u r e  s h o r t a g e s  of  c a p i t a l  s t o c k  
and h o u s i n g  and weakening t h e  i n d u s t r i e s  t h a t  produce f o r  e x p o r t  and 
compete w i t h  i m p o r t s .  They t h e r e f o r e  r e p r e s e n t  a t h r e a t  t o  b a s i c  i n d u s t r y  
and t o  t h e  growth of p r o d u c t i v i t y .  They a l s o  add t o  t h e  c o s t  of  government 
and t o  t h e  d e b t - s e r v i c e  problems o f  d e b t o r  c o u n t r i e s .  
The r e c e n t  e s c a l a t i o n  of i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  began w i t h  t h e  r i s e  i n  o i l  
p r i c e s  of 1979  combined w i t h  r e s t r i c t i v e  monetary  p o l i c i e s  on t h e  p a r t  o f  
t h e  F e d e r a l  Rese rve .  The second wave o f  e s c a l a t i o n  b e g i n n i n g  i n  mid-1980 
was a g a i n  t h e  p roduc t  of  r a p i d  i n f l a t i o n  r e l a t i v e  t o  monetary  growth.  The p e r -  
s i s t e n c e  of  h i g h  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  seems p r i m a r i l y  a t t r i b u t a b l e  .to t h e  combina t ion  
o f  e x p a n s i o n a r y  f i s c a l  p o l i c y  w i t h  c o n t i n u e d  monetary  r e s t r a i n t .  
I n t e r e s t  r a t e s  a r e  p r o b a b l y  a l s o  h i g h e r  today  b e c a u s e  o f  such 
f i n a n c i a l  i n n o v a t i o n s  a s  NOW a c c o u n t s  and Money Plarket Mutual  Funds ,  s i n c e  
t h e s e  i n n o v a t i o n s  r a i s e  bank c o s t s  and a l s o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  demand f o r  money 
by i n c r e a s i n g  i t s  y i e l d .  Long-term r a t e s  a r e  a l s o  h i g h e r  b e c a u s e  i n t e r e s t  
r a t e s  have  become more v a r i a b l e ,  c a u s i n g  i n v e s t o r s  t o  r e q u i r e  g r e a t e r  
r i s k  premiums. Both of t h e s e  l a t t e r  f a c t o r s  might  b e  n e u t r a l i z e d  by a  one-t ime 
i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  money s u p p l y  t o  accomodate  t h e  g r e a t e r  l i q u i d i t y  p r e f e r e n c e  
caused  by t h e s e  changes .  
I n f l a t i o n a r y  e x p e c t a t i o n s  t end  t o  i n c r e a s e  nominal  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  but  
t e n d  t o  lower r e a l  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  S i n c e  t h e  r e a l  c o s t  o f  borrowing d e c l i n e s ,  
a  r i s e  i n  t h e  expec ted  r a t e  of  i n f l a t i o n  i s  e x p a n s i o n a r y .  I n f l a t i o n a r y  
e x p e c t a t i o n s  canno t  e x p l a i n  h i g h  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  on s h o r t - t e r m  i n s t r u m e n t s .  
* The a u t h o r  wishes  t o  thank  W i l l i a m  A. Cox, John B .  Henderson,  Roger S .  Whi te ,  
and G .  Thomas Woodward f o r  comments and c r i t i c i s m s  o f  e a r l i e r  d r a f t s .  
Joanne L .  Orndor f f  and Sheree  Wood p rov ided  s e c r e t a r i a l  a s s i s t a n c e .  
I n f l a t i o n a r y  e x p e c t a t i o n s  a r e  m a i n l y  o f  a s s i s t a n c e  i n  e x p l a i n i n g  t h e  w i d e r  
s p r e a d  between nominal  long  and s h o r t - t e r m  r a t e s .  S i m i l a r l y ,  t h e  e x p e c t a t i o n  
o f  h i g h e r  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  due t o  t h e  p e r s i s t e n c e  o f  budget  d e f i c i t s  a l s o  h e l p s  
t o  e x p l a i n  a  w i d e r  s p r e a d  by c a u s i n g  bor rowers  t o  s h i f t  t o  long- term bor rowing  
t o  lock  i n  t o d a y ' s  lower r a t e s ,  w h i l e  l e n d e r s  s h i f t  t o  s h o r t - t e r m  l e n d i n g  t o  
a v e r t  c a p i t a l  l o s s e s  as  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  c l i m b .  
The f a c t  t h a t  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  f r e q u e n t l y  i n c r e a s e  when i t  i s  announced t h a t  
t h e  money s t o c k  has grown f a s t e r  t h a n  expec ted  appears  due t o  i n c r e a s e s  i n  t h e  
demand f o r  money provoked by t h e  e x p e c t a t i o n  t h a t  r a t e s  w i l l  r i s e  as t h e  F e d e r a l  
Reserve  c u r t a i l s  money growth t o  i t s  t a r g e t  r a n g e .  T h i s  phenomenon shou ld  
n o t  o b s c u r e  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  i n c r e a s e s  i n  t h e  money s u p p l y ,  i f  c o n t i n u e d ,  pu t  
downward p r e s s u r e  on s h o r t - t e r m  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s ,  a l though  a s s o c i a t e d  f e a r s  o f  
f u t u r e  i n f l a t i o n  may r a i s e  long- term r a t e s .  It i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  pursue  e f f e c t i v e  
monetary  p o l i c y  as  l o n g  a s  i n c r e a s e s  i n  t h e  money s t o c k  above aqnounced t a r g e t s  
c a u s e  t h e  demand f o r  money t o  r i s e  f o r  p u r e l y  p o r t f o l i o  r e a s o n s ,  w h i l e  r a i s i n g  
t h e  t a r g e t  r a n g e s  f o r  monetary  growth r u n s  s e r i o u s  r i s k s  o f  a l a rming  i n f l a t i o n -  
wary i n v e s t o r s .  
D e s p i t e  t h e  c o n c e r n  o v e r  h i g h  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s ,  t h e r e  i s  l i t t l e  o r  no e v i d e n c e  
t o  s u g g e s t  t h a t  a  r e t u r n  t o  t h e  pre-1979 p o l i c y  o f  i n t e r e s t - r a t e  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  
would improve t h e  economy's performance.  The s t a b i l i t y  o f  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  i s  l i k e l y  
t o  b e  purchased a t  t h e  c o s t  of  i n s t a b i l i t y  i n  i n t e r e s t - s e n s i t i v e  e x p e n d i t u r e  c a t e -  
g o r i e s  such as  h o u s i n g  and b u s i n e s s  i n v e s t m e n t .  
S e v e r a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  s u g g e s t  t h a t  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  may r i s e  from t h e i r  
p r e s e n t  l e v e l s .  S ~ ~ s t a i n e d  r e c o v e r y  would add upward p r e s s u r e  on i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  
as would f u r t h e r  i n c r e a s e s  i n  t h e  s t r u c t u r a l  budget  d e f i c i t ,  t h a t  i s ,  t h e  p a r t  
oE t h e  d e f i c i t  n o t  t r a c e a b l e  t o  r e c e s s i o n .  The l i k e l i h o o d  t h a t  p u b l i c  d e b t  i n  
t h e  hands  o f  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  w i l l  grow more r a p i d l y  t h a n  t h e  money 
s u p p l y  may add f u r t h e r  upward p r e s s u r e  inasmuch as i n v e s t o r s  w i l l  a t t empt  
t o  m a i n t a i n  b a l a n c e d  p o r t f o l i o s  by d i s p o s i n g  of  some government s e c u r i t i e s  
i n  exchange f o r  c a s h  b a l a n c e s .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand,  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  r e l a t i v e  
t o  i n f l a t i o n  remain e x t r e m e l y  h i g h  by h i s t o r i c a l  s t a n d a r d s ,  and t h e  i n f l a t i o n  
premium i n  long- term r a t e s  c o u l d  d e c l i n e  i f  i n f l a t i o n  remains  below t h e  
l e v e l s  o f  t h e  1975-79 expans ion  p e r i o d .  
It  i s  w i d e l y  agreed t h a t  t h e  most e f f e c t i v e  a t t a c k  on t h e  problem o f  
h i g h  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  and t h e i r  consequences  would b e  a  r e v e r s a l  o f  t h e  monetary-  
f i s c a l  p o l i c y  mix.  T h i s  i m p l i e s  a  combina t ion  o f  e x p e n d i t u r e  r e d u c t i o n  and 
t a x  i n c r e a s e s  on t h e  f i s c a l  s i d e  w i t h  a  t e m p o r a r i l y  more s t i m u l a t i v e  mone ta ry  
p o l i c y .  Such a  change i n  t h e  p o l i c y  mix c o u l d  b e  made t o  a c h i e v e  t h e  same 
l e v e l  o f  a g g r e g a t e  e x p e n d i t u r e ,  b u t  a t  lower  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s ,  and i t  need n o t ,  
t h e r e f o r e ,  b e  i n f l a t i o n a r y .  

HIGH INTEREST RATES : CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND ISSUES 
I n t e r e s t  r a t e s  e s c a l a t e d  s h a r p l y  i n  t h e  midd le  of 1979 and a g a i n  i n  t h e  
l a s t  h a l f  of 1980. Although t h e y  have ebbed c o n s i d e r a b l y  i n  r e s p o n s e  t o  t h e  
d e c l i n i n g  c r e d i t  demands caused by t h e  r e c e s s i o n  of 1981-82 t h e y  remain s u b s t a n -  
t i a l l y  h i g h e r  t h a n  a t  comparable  s t a g e s  o f  p r e v i o u s  b u s i n e s s  c y c l e s ,  and t h e r e  
i s  f e a r  t h a t  t h e y  w i l l  c l imb a g a i n  i n  t h e  n e a r  f u t u r e .  T h i s  paper  a n a l y z e s  
v a r i o u s  r e a s o n s  g i v e n  f o r  t h e  e s c a l a t i o n  of i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  and t h e i r  p e r s i s t e n c e  
a t  h i g h  l e v e l s .  There  i s ,  a s  w e l l ,  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e  consequences  o f  h i g h e r  
i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  f o r  t h e  economy. A  c o n c l u d i n g  s e c t i o n  a n a l y z e s  a l t e r n a t i v e  
p r o p o s a l s  f o r  d e a l i n g  w i t h  t h e  problem. 
1. THE INTEREST RATE ESCALATION 
The accompanying c h a r t  shows t h e  p a t h  of s e l e c t e d  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  o v e r  t h e  
p e r i o d  1975 t o  1983. A s  c a n  be s e e n ,  t h e  end of 1976 marked t h e  low p o i n t  f o r  
i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  p r i o r  t o  t h e  e s c a l a t i o n  t h a t  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  subsequen t  y e a r s .  
Fol lowing t h a t  low p o i n t ,  t h e y  began a n  upward movement t h a t ,  u n t i l  t h e  m i d d l e  
o f  1979, would be regarded  a s  normal f o r  a  p e r i o d  o f  economic r e c o v e r y .  How- 
e v e r ,  t h e  midd le  of 1979 t o  t h e  s p r i n g  of 1980 w i t n e s s e d  a  remarkably  s h a r p  
r i s e  i n  a l l  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  Th i s  w a s  fo l lowed by some e a s i n g  i n  t h e  summer of 
1980,  a s  t h e  economy e n t e r e d  a  b r i e f  d e c l i n e ,  and by y e t  a n o t h e r  d r a m a t i c  
e s c a l a t i o n  i n  t h e  l a t t e r  h a l f  of 1980 t h a t  c o n t i n u e d  u n t i l  t h e  l a t t e r  p a r t  o f  
1981. There  t h e n  came a d e c l i n e  which extended th rough  l a t e  1982. S i n c e  t h a t  
t i m e  t h e  p a t h  h a s  been upward b u t  a t  a g e n t l e  pace .  
INTEREST RATES AND BOND YIELDS 
PIRCEhT PER M N U M  
S O U R C E :  Council of  Eccnomic , A d v i s e r s .  
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The two waves of e s c a l a t i o n  l e f t  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  h i g h e r  
d u r i n g  t h e  r e c e n t  r e c e s s i o n  and r e v i v a l  t h a n  a t  comparable s t a g e s  of p rev ious  
b u s i n e s s  c y c l e s .  A comparison of c y c l i c a l  t roughs  shows t h a t  r a t e s  on Aaa 
c o r p o r a t e  bonds averaged 7.9 pe rcen t  i n  t h e  f o u r t h  q u a r t e r  of 1970 and 8.7 per- 
c e n t  i n  t h e  f i r s t  q u a r t e r  of 1975. This  i s  i n  sha rp  c o n t r a s t  t o  t h e  11.7 pe rcen t  
average  recorded  d u r i n g  t h e  f o u r t h  q u a r t e r  of 1982. Thus long-term r a t e s  have 
r a t c h e t e d  upward by 3.8 percentage  p o i n t s  over  t h e i r  1970 l e v e l  and 3.0 pe rcen t -  
age  p o i n t s  ove r  1975. 
Short- term i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  show a s i m i l a r ,  though l e s s  pronounced, e s c a l a t i o n .  
I n  t h e  f o u r t h  q u a r t e r  of 1982 t h e  r a t e  on 3-month Treasury  B i l l s  averaged  8.0 
p e r c e n t ,  exceeding  t h e  5.4 and 5.9-percent averages  of t h e  p rev ious  two c y c l i c a l  
t rough  q u a r t e r s  by 2.6 and 2.1 pe rcen tage  p o i n t s  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  
The spread  between s h o r t  and long-term i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  has  a l s o  widened 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y .  I n  t h e  e a r l i e r  c y c l i c a l  t rough q u a r t e r s  t h e  Aaa r a t e  exceeded t h e  
b i l l  r a t e  by 2.5 and 2.8 pe rcen tage  p o i n t s  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  I n  t h e  1982 t rough  
q u a r t e r  t h i s  spread  was 3.7 percentage  p o i n t s ,  n e a r l y  one- th i rd  wider  t han  i n  
1975. ' 
Observed i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  a r e  u s u a l l y  r e f e r r e d  t o  a s  nominal i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  
When t h e  l o s s  due t o  i n f l a t i o n  i n  t h e  purchasing power of t h e  l o a n  repay- 
ment i s  deducted from t h e  nominal r a t e ,  t h e  remaining r e t u r n  i s  c a l l e d  t h e  r e a l  
r a t e  of i n t e r e s t .  A ve ry  rough i n d i c a t i o n  of r e a l  r a t e s  can  be ob ta ined  by 
s u b t r a c t i n g  t h e  a c t u a l  i n f l a t i o n  r a t e s  from nominal i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  Th i s  shows 
t h a t  t h e  spread  between r e a l  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  i n  t h e  1982 t rough and p rev ious  
t roughs  i s  even wider  than  the  spread  between nominal r a t e s .  For example, t h e  
i m p l i c i t  p r i c e  d e f l a t o r  f o r  Gross Na t iona l  Product  ( G N P )  grew a t  an  annual  r a t e  
of 6 . 3  pe rcen t  i n  t h e  f o u r t h  q u a r t e r  of  1970 and 3.8 pe rcen t  i n  t h e  f o u r t h  q u a r t e r  
of 1982. S u b t r a c t i n g  t h e s e  i n f l a t i o n  r a t e s  from t h e  nominal Aaa r a t e  g i v e s  r e a l  
r a t e s  o f  1 . 6  and 7 .9  p e r c e n t  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  imply ing  an i n c r e a s e  of  6 . 3  p e r c e n t a g e  
p o i n t s .  S i m i l a r l y ,  r e a l  s h o r t - t e r m  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s ,  d e f i n e d  i n  t h i s  manner,  
averaged -0.9 p e r c e n t  i n  t h e  e a r l i e r  p e r i o d  as opposed t o  4 . 2  p e r c e n t  i n  1982,  
implying a  r i s e  o f  5 . 1  p e r c e n t a g e  p o i n t s .  Thus b o t h  nominal  and r e a l  r a t e s  o f  
i n t e r e s t  a r e  much h i g h e r  t h a n  p r e v i o u s l y .  
F i n a l l y ,  i t  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  t o  n o t e  t h a t  t h e s e  changes  have been accompa- 
n i e d  by g r e a t e r  v o l a t i l i t y  of  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  As e x p l a i n e d  l a t e r ,  t h i s  i n c r e a s e d  
v o l a t i l i t y  i s  p r o b a b l y  a t t r i b u t a b l e  t o  changes  i n  F e d e r a l  Rese rve  o p e r a t i n g  pro- 
c e d u r e s  t h a t  began i n  October  1979.  A u s e f u l  measure  of  t h e  v a r i a b i l i t y  o f  
i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  i s  t h e  s t a n d a r d  d e v i a t i o n .  For q u a r t e r l y  average  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  
on 3-month T r e a s u r y  b i l l s ,  t h e  s t a n d a r d  d e v i a t i o n  was 1 . 7 8  p e r c e n t a g e  p o i n t s  
of  i n t e r e s t  f o r  t h e  p e r i o d  e x t e n d i n g  from t h e  f i r s t  q u a r t e r  o f  1977 t o  t h e  
t h i r d  q u a r t e r  o f  1979.  But f o r  t h e  subsequen t  p e r i o d ,  e x t e n d i n g  from t h e  
f o u r t h  q u a r t e r  o f  1979 through t h e  f o u r t h  q u a r t e r  o f  1983, t h e  s t a n d a r d  
devia-c ion was 2.43 p e r c e n t a g e  p o i n t s .  The i n c r e a s e  i n  t h i s  measure  o f  v o l a -  
t i l i t y  i s  t h e r e f o r e  36 p e r c e n t .  
I n  summary, t h e r e  a r e  t h r e e  d i s t i n c t  f a c t s  t h e  emergence and consequences  
o f  which r e q u i r e  a n a l y s i s .  The f i r s t  i s  t h a t  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  appear t o  have r e a c h e d  
a p l a t e a u  a t  h i g h e r  l e v e l s  t h a n  a t  p r e v i o u s ,  comparable  s t a g e s  of  t h e  b u s i n e s s  
c y c l e .  The second i s  t h a t  t h e  s p r e a d  between long  and s h o r t - t e r m  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  
h a s  widened.  The t h i r d  i s  t h a t  f l u c t u a t i o n s  i n  s h o r t - t e r m  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  
have  become s i ~ b s t ~ t i a l l y  more pronounced.  
11. CONSEQUENCES OF HIGH INTEREST RATES FOR THE ECONOMY 
High i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  r e t a r d  spend ing  i n  i n t e r e s t - s e n s i t i v e  s e c t o r s  o f  
t h e  economy. The p r i n c i p a l  v i c t i m s  a r e  home c o n s t r u c t i o n ,  consumer d u r a b l e  
goods,  b u s i n e s s  f i x e d  inves tment ,  e x p o r t s ,  and import-competing s e c t o r s .  As 
a  consequence,  t h e  mix o f  f i n a l  demands i n  t h e  economy t e n d s  t o  be  h e a v i l y  
consumpt ion-or ien ted .  I n  t h e  l o n g e r  r u n  t h e  r e s u l t  may be  supp ly  c o n s t r a i n t s  
t h a t  c r e a t e  b o t t l e n e c k s  and l e a d  t o  a  r e v i v a l  o f  i n f l a t i o n .  Housing c o n s t r u c -  
t i o n ,  f o r  example,  appears  t o  have been runn ing  w e l l  below l e v e l s  needed 
t o  meet r e q u i r e m e n t s  impl ied  by demographic c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .  I n  August 
1983 new p r i v a t e  h o u s i n g  u n i t s  s t a r t e d  recovered  t o  1 .9  m i l l i o n  u n i t s  a n n u a l l y ,  
b u t  t h e n  ebbed t o  1 . 7  m i l l i o n  i n  September and remained n e a r  t h a t  l e v e l  
th rough  y e a r ' s  end,  i n  c o n t r a s t  w i t h  t h e  more t h a n  2 m i l l i o n  mark normal ly  
a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  a  f u l l y  recovered  homebui lding i n d u s t r y .  These developments  
s e e n  l i k e l y  t o  a g g r a v a t e  a  growing n a t i o n a l  hous ing  s h o r t  age t h a t  c o u l d  r e s u l t  
i n  a  s h a r p  e s c a l a t i o n  o f  r e a l  e s t a t e  v a l u e s  and r e n t a l  c o s t s ,  which i n  t u r n  
c o u l d  c o n t r i b u t e  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  t o  i n f l a t i o n .  
Nonres i d e n t i  a1 f i x e d  inves tment  h a s  been s u r p r i s i n g l y  s t r o n g  a g a i n s t  t h e  
backdrop o f  h i g h  long-term i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  During t h e  r e c o v e r y  y e a r s  1971 and 
1975 r e a l  n o n r e s i d e n t i a l  f i x e d  i n v e s  trnent averaged 10.0  and 9 . 7  p e r c e n t  o f  r e a l  
GNP r e s p e c t i v e l y .  I n  t h e  c u r r e n t  r e c o v e r y  such inves tment  averaged 1 0 . 8  p e r c e n t  
of r e a l  G N P  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  t h r e e  q u a r t e r s  o f  1983. P o s s i b l y  t h e  d e p r e s s i n g  e f f e c t  
o f  h i g h  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  h a s  been o f f s e t  by t h e  improved c o r p o r a t e  c a s h  f low and 
h i g h e r  a f t e r - t a x  r a t e s  o f  r e t u r n  on new investment  t h a t  s tem from t h e  b u s i n e s s  t a x  
p r o v i s i o n s  o f  t h e  Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 as w e l l  a s  from t h e  b e n e f i -  
c i a l  e f f e c t s  o f  reduced i n f l a t i o n .  11 - 
N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  many economis t s  c o n t i n u e  t o  be concerned about  c a p i t a l  
accumula t ion  r a t e s  i n s u f f i c i e n t  t o  p r o v i d e  f o r  a d e q u a t e  growth i n  t h e  economy's 
c a p i t a l - l a b o r  r a t i o  and t h e r e f o r e  i n  p r o d u c t i v i t y .  21 As a  consequence of t h e  - 
s e v e r e  1982 r e c e s s i o n ,  even more p o t e n t i a l  new c a p i t a l  s t o c k  h a s  been l o s t  t h a n  
i n  p r e v i o u s  r e c e s s i o n s .  T h i s  means t h a t  l a b o r  h a s  l e s s  c a p i t a l  w i t h  which t o  
work t h a n  would o t h e r w i s e  have been t h e  c a s e .  B a r r i n g  sudden e f f o r t s  by b u s i n e s s  
t o  r e c o u p  p a s t  inves tment  s h o r t f a l l s ,  r e v i v a l  of t h e  economy c o u l d  l e a d  t o  
c a p a c i t y  b o t t l e n e c k s  a t  unemployment r a t e s  h i g h e r  t h a n  t h o s e  a t  which such  con- 
s t r a i n t s  were met i n  t h e  p a s t .  I n  t h a t  e v e n t  t h e r e  may be no a l t e r n a t i v e  f o r  
t h e  economy o t h e r  t h a n  t o  a c c e p t  h i g h e r  unemployment o r  t o  s u f f e r  a  r e v i v a l  o f  
i n f l a t i o n .  
I n c r e a s e s  i n  government purchases  of goods and s e r v i c e s  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  
p e r s o n a l  t a x  r e d u c t i o n s  r a i s e  t h e  s h a r e s  o f  government and p r i v a t e  consumption 
i n  GNP. I n  a n  environment  of economic s l a c k  t h i s  c r e a t e s  l i t t l e  danger  of 
c o m p e t i t i o n  e i t h e r  f o r  r e a l  r e s o u r c e s  o r  f o r  f u n d s ,  p rov ided  monetary  p o l i c y  
i s  accommodative. However, a t  l a t e r  s t a g e s  of b u s i n e s s  expans ion  such  competi-  
1/ For a n  a n a l y s i s  t h a t  e l a b o r a t e s  t h e s e  p o i n t s ,  s e e  U.S. L i b r a r y  of 
c o n g r e s s .  C o n g r e s s i o n a l  Research S e r v i c e .  E f f e c t s  of Tax D e p r e c i a t i o n  
Changes and F e d e r a l  D e f i c i t s  on t h e  A l l o c a t i o n  of C a p i t a l  and Output :  A 
S i m u l a t i o n  S tudy ,  (Report  No. 83-126 E ) ,  by J a n e  G.  G r a v e l l e ,  J u l y  1983. 
2/ The c o n n e c t i o n  between l a b o r  p r o d u c t i v i t y  and t h e  c a p i t a l  l a b o r  r a t i o  
c a n  b e  unders tood  by n o t i n g  t h a t  l a b o r  p r o d u c t i v i t y  (Q/L) may be p a r t i t i o n e d  a s  
where Q ,  L ,  and K a r e  a g g r e g a t e  o u t p u t ,  l a b o r ,  and c a p i t a l  s t o c k ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  
Q/K i s  c a p i t a l  p r o d u c t i v i t y  and K / L  i s  t h e  c a p i t a l - l a b o r  r a t i o .  Thus i t  c a n  be  
s e e n  t h a t  l a b o r  p r o d u c t i v i t y  may be r a i s e d  e i t h e r  by i n c r e a s i n g  t h e  p r o d u c t i v i t y  
o f  c a p i t a l  o r  by r a i s i n g  t h e  c a p i t a l - l a b o r  r a t i o .  
t i o n  i n t e n s i f i e s .  I n t e r e s t  r a t e s  may t h e n  b e  e x p e c t e d  t o  r i s e  and t h e  i n v e s t -  
ment "crowd o u t "  t h a t  i s  s o  w i d e l y  f e a r e d  may t h e n  o c c u r .  
Crowd o u t  i s  a  phenomenon t h a t  normal ly  accompanies a  b u s i n e s s  r e v i v a l .  
Today 's  u n u s u a l  danger  i s  t h a t  w i t h  government c l a i m i n g  a  l a r g e r  s h a r e  o f  GNP and 
w i t h  consumption remain ing  s t r o n g  as t h e  r e s u l t  of  t a x  r e d u c t i o n ,  t h e r e  w i l l  b e  
l e s s  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  i n v e s t m e n t .  Thus,  a l though  crowding o u t  appears  n o t  t o  b e  a  
s e r i o u s  problem a t  t h i s  t ime ,  i t  may become a  problem i n  t h e  n e a r  f u t u r e  b e c a u s e  
o f  t h e  i n c r e a s e d  government and consumption s h a r e s  i m p l i e d  by c u r r e n t  f i s c a l  
p o l i c i e s .  I m p l i c i t  i n  t h i s  s c e n a r i o  a r e  s h a r p l y  r i s i n g  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  and a  
s m a l l e r  t h a n  t r a d i t i o n a l  s h a r e  o f  inves tment  i n  t h e  G N P .  
High i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  a r e  w i d e l y  viewed as  a  t h r e a t  t o  r e c o v e r y .  The argument 
may w e l l  b e  v a l i d  i f  i t  r e f e r s  t o  t h e  l i k e l i h o o d  o f  s u p p l y  b o t t l e n e c k s  stemming 
from u n d e r i n v e s  tment i n  h o u s i n g  and c  a p i t  a1 s t o c k .  I n  t h a t  s c e n a r i o  i n f l a t i o n a r y  
p r e s s u r e s  b e g i n  a t  an e a r l i e r  s t a g e  o f  r e v i v a l ,  f o r c i n g  t h e  F e d e r a l  Rese rve  i n t o  
a  r e s t r i c t i v e  monetary  p o s t u r e  t h a t  b r i n g s  expans ion  t o  a  h a l t  w i t h  unemployment 
r a t e s  a t  l e v e l s  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  h i g h e r  t h a n  a t  ~ r e v i o u s  c y c l i c a l  peaks .  
sometimes t h e  argument i m p l i e s  a  s t r a n g l i n g  o f  a g g r e g a t e  demand t h a t  would 
n o t  o c c u r  w i t h  lower  budget  d e f i c i t s  and t h e  i m p l i e d  lower  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  I n  
t h i s  form t h e  argument would appear  t o  l a c k  f o u n d a t i o n .  O t h e r  t h i n g s  e q u a l ,  a  
1 a r g e r  s t r u c t u r a l  budge t  d e f i c i t  adds more t o  a g g r e g a t e  e x p e n d i t u r e  t h a n  a  lower  
s t r u c t u r a l  d e f i c i t .  3 /  I f  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  were b r o u g h t  down by a  r e d u c t i o n  i n  - 
3/  The s t r u c t u r a l ,  o r  i m p l i c i t ,  budget  d e f i c i t  r e f e r s  t o  t h e  d e f i c i t  
i n  t h y  budget  t h a t  remains  a f t e r  t h e  removal o f  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  t h e  r e c e s s i o n  
on t h e  d e f i c i t .  I n  t h e  c a l c u l a t i o n s  o f  t h i s  paper  a  5 . l - p e r c e n t  unemployment 
r a t e  i s  c o n s i d e r e d  t h e  "benchmark" a g a i n s t  which t h e  s t r u c t u r a l  d e f i c i t  i s  
measured.  A one-percen tage-po in t  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  unemployment r a t e  c o s t s  t h e  
T r e a s u r y  about $18 b i l l i o n  i n  l o s t  r evenue  a n n u a l l y .  I t  a l s o  i m p l i e s  g r e a t e r  
o u t l a y s ,  p r i m a r i l y  on unemployment compensat ion,  o f  about S6 b i l l i o n .  There-  
f o r e ,  a  one-percen tage-po in t  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  unemployment r a t e  adds $24 
( c o n t i n u e d )  
t h e  d e f i c i t ,  a g g r e g a t e  e x p e n d i t u r e  would b e  reduced ,  and t h a t  r e d u c t i o n ,  r a t h e r  
t h a n  h i g h  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s ,  would s low t h e  economy. Lower i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  would 
encourage  some e x p e n d i t u r e  components t o  r i s e ,  b u t  t h i s  c a n n o t  o f f s e t  t h e  d e c l i n e  
i n  spend ing  i m p l i e d  by a  t a x  i n c r e a s e .  The r e a s o n  i s  t h a t  a  t a x  i n c r e a s e  b r i n g s  
i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  down because  i t  r e d u c e s  t o t a l  spend ing  and, t h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  demand 
f o r  money and c r e d i t  r e l a t i v e  t o  i t s  s u p p l y .  It i s  p r e c i s e l y  because  t h e  t a x  
i n c r e a s e  h a s  a  r e s t r i c t i v e  e f f e c t  t h a t  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  d e c l i n e .  I f  t o t a l  
spend ing  were h i g h e r  a f t e r  t h e  t a x  i n c r e a s e ,  t h e  demand f o r  money would b e  
g r e a t e r  and i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  would b e  h i g h e r .  
While d o m e s t i c  crowding o u t  r e c e i v e s  t h e  bu lk  of  t h e  a t t e n t i o n ,  i t  i s  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  crowding o u t  t h a t  i s  now h a v i n g  t h e  s e v e r e s t  impact on t h e  
economy. A r i s e  i n  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  h a s  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  a t t r a c t i n g  f o r e i g n  s h o r t -  
t e rm c a p i t a l .  Under t h e  f l e x i b l e  exchange r a t e  sys tem,  t h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  
demand f o r  do l l a r -denomina ted  a s s e t s  h e l p s  t o  ho ld  down i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  b u t  i t  
i n c r e a s e s  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  exchange v a l u e  o f  t h e  d o l l a r  r e l a t i v e  t o  
o t h e r . c u r r e n c i e s ,  T h i s  lowers  t h e  d o l l a r  c o s t  o f  impor t s  t o  Americans 
and r a i s e s  t h e  c o s t  o f  U.S. e x p o r t s  t o  p o t e n t i a l  f o r e i g n  b u y e r s .  The r e s u l t  
( c o n t i n u e d )  b i l l i o n  t o  t h e  a c t u a l  d e f i c i t .  I n  t h e  f i r s t  t h r e e  q u a r t e r s  o f  
1983 t h e  a c t u a l  d e f i c i t  r a n  a t  an annual  r a t e  o f  $179 .3  b i l l i o n .  However, 
s i n c e  t h e  unemployment r a t e  averaged 10.0  p e r c e n t ,  t h e  d i s c r e p a n c y  o f  4 . 9  
p e r c e n t  between t h e  a c t u a l  and t h e  benchmark r a t e  i m p l i e s  t h a t  t h e  r e c e s s i o n -  
caused  p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  d e f i c i t  came t o  $117.8  b i l l i o n .  S u b t r a c t i n g  t h i s  from 
t h e  a c t u a l  d e f i c i t  y i e l d s  a  s t r u c t u r a l  d e f i c i t  o f  $ 6 2 . 2  b i l l i o n .  
The s t r u c t u r a l  d e f i c i t  i s  t h e  measure  most commonly used by economis t s  
t o  a s s e s s  whether  t h e  budget  i s  becoming more e x p a n s i o n a r y  o r  r e s t r i c t i v e .  
The a c t u a l  budget  d e f i c i t  canno t  do t h i s  because  i t  f l u c t u a t e s  i n  r e s p o n s e  
t o  changes  i n  t h e  economy. It c a n n o t  t h e r e f o r e  i s o l a t e  t h e  e f f e c t s  of f i s c a l  
p o l i c y .  For  example,  t h e  a c t u a l  d e f i c i t  i s  expec ted  t o  d e c l i n e  i n  F i s c a l  Year 
1984.  However, t h i s  i s  n o t  due t o  r e s t r i c t i v e  f i s c a l  a c t i o n  and i s  c a u s e d ,  
r a t h e r ,  by improvement i n  t h e  economy. F i s c a l  p o l i c y  i n  FY 1984 w i l l  a c t u a l l y  
b e  somewhat e x p a n s i o n a r y  accord ing  t o  e s t i m a t e s  which show t h e  s t r u c t u r  a1 d e f i c i t  
t o  b e  widening.  On t h i s  p o i n t  s e e  Congress  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s .  C o n g r e s s i o n a l  
Budget O f f i c e .  The Economic and Budget Out look:  An Update .  A Repor t  t o  
The S e n a t e  and House Committees on t h e  Budget.  August 1983.  
To put  t h e  p o i n t  d i f f e r e n t l y ,  t h e  a c t u a l  budget  d e f i c i t  r e f l e c t s  b o t h  t h e  
i n f l u e n c e  o f  t h e  budge t  on t h e  economy and t h e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  t h e  economy on t h e  
b u d g e t .  By removing t h e  1 a t t e r ,  t h e  s t r u c t u r a l  d e f i c i t  d e f i n i t e l y  i m p l i e s  t h a t  
f  i s c  a1 p o l i c y  i s  moving i n  an e x p a n s i o n a r y  d i r e c t i o n .  
CRS -9 
i s  a  r e d u c t i o n  i n  e x p o r t  s a l e s  and a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  volume o f  i m p o r t s .  
Both developments  p l a c e  a  d r a g  on domes t i c  economic a c t i v i t y ,  e s p e c i a l l y  
i n  t h e  b a s i c  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  i n d u s t r i e s  t h a t  p roduce  f o r  e x p o r t  and compete 
w i t h  i m p o r t s .  The r a p i d l y  d e c l i n i n g  t r a d e  b a l a n c e  s lows GNP growth and 
d i s t o r t s  t h e  b a l a n c e  of  t h e  economy's r e c o v e r y ,  a l t h o u g h  t h i s  d r a g  d o e s  n o t  
n u l l i f y  t h e  e x p a n s i o n a r y  e f f e c t s  p rov ided  by d e f i c i t  spend ing .  
The s h a r p  e s c a l a t i o n  o f  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  t h a t  o c c u r r e d  i n  mid-1980 c o i n c i d e d  
w i t h  t h e  o n s e t  of  a  s i n i i l a r l y  s h a r p  r i s e  i n  t h e  exchange v a l u e  o f  t h e  d o l l a r .  
By August 1983 t h e  v a l u e  o f  t h e  d o l l a r  had r i s e n  48.6 p e r c e n t  o v e r  i t s  1981 
v a l u e  a g a i n s t  a  t r ade -weigh ted  combina t ion  o f  t e n  major c u r r e n c i e s ,  s i g n i f y i n g  
a n  enormous d e t e r i o r a t i o n  i n  t h e  c o m p e t i t i v e  p o s i t i o n  o f  e x p o r t s  and a  c o r r e -  
sponding r i s e  i n  t h e  a t t r a c t i v e n e s s  of  i m p o r t s  r e l a t i v e  t o  d o m e s t i c a l l y  produced 
goods.  Trade  s t a t i s t i c s  r e f l e c t  t h e  impact  o f  t h e s e  r e l a t i v e  p r i c e  changes .  
I n  t h e  f o u r t h  q u a r t e r  of  1983 t h e  v a l u e  o f  e x p o r t s  i n  c o n s t a n t  1972 d o l l a r s  had 
f a l l e n  t o  a n  a n n u a l  r a t e  of $141.5 b i l l i o n  a s  compared w i t h  $159 .1  b i l l i o n  i n  
1980,  a d e c l i n e  of  11 p e r c e n t .  I m p o r t s ,  meanwhi le ,  i n c r e a s e d  27.8 p e r c e n t  
from $108.8  b i l l i o n  i n  1980 t o  a n  a n n u a l  r a t e  of $139.0 b i l l i o n  i n  t h e  f o u r t h  
q u a r t e r  of 1983.  I n  combina t ion ,  t h e s e  developments  produced a  r e d u c t i o n  i n  n e t  
e x p o r t s  of $47 .8  b i l l i o n  from $50.3 b i l l i o n  t o  o n l y  $2 .5  b i l l i o n .  Net e x p o r t s ,  
which had c o n t r i b u t e d  3 .4  p e r c e n t  t o  r e a l  GNP, now c o n t r i b u t e  v i r t u a l l y  n o t h i n g .  
Crowding o u t  c l e a r l y  h a s  been  main ly  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  i n  c h a r a c t e r .  
These t r a d e  developments  r e p r e s e n t  a  s e r l o u s  s o u r c e  of  weakness i n  t h e  economy 
and a r e  t o  some e x t e n t  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  t h e  d e p t h  and s e v e r i t y  o f  t h e  r e c e s s i o n .  
They appear  t o  be  h e a v i l y  a t t r i b u t a b l e  t o  h i g h  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  and exchange 
r a t e s  a l t h o u g h  t h e  l a g g i n g  b u s i n e s s  r e c o v e r y  abroad  a l s o  p l a y s  an  i m p o r t a n t  
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r o l e  i n  t h e  s t a g n a t i o n  o f  e x p o r t s .  S i n c e  a  p r i n c i p a l  impact o f  t h e  t r a d e  
d e c l i n e  i s  on t h e  manufac tu r ing  s e c t o r ,  i t  i s  wide ly  r e g a r d e d  as a  t h r e a t  t o  
t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  economy. 
There  i s  an a d d i t i o n a l  r e a s o n  f o r  suppos ing  t h a t  h i g h  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  
c a u s e  e x p o r t s  t o  s u f f e r .  Recen t ly  s e v e r a l  c o u n t r i e s  w i t h  heavy i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
i n d e b t e d n e s s  have had t o  impose a u s t e r i t y  measures t h a t  i n c l u d e  t h e  c u r t a i l m e n t  
o f  impor t s .  The mounting i n t e r n a t i o n a l  d e b t  problems o f  t h e s e  c o u n t r i e s  have  
been e x a c e r b a t e d  by t h e  e s c a l a t i o n  o f  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  s i n c e  t h i s  h a s  g r e a t l y  
i n c r e a s e d  t h e  c o s t  o f  d e b t  s e r v i c e .  Acqui r ing  r e s o u r c e s  from p r i v a t e  as w e l l  
as o f f i c i a l  bor rowers  h a s  become d i f f i c u l t  and f r e q u e n t l y  comes a t  t h e  p r i c e  
o f  s o - c a l l e d  c o n d i t i o n a l i t i e s  t h a t  f o r c e  c o u n t r i e s  t o  t a k e  s t e p s  t o  r e d u c e  
impor t s  e i t h e r  d i r e c t l y  o r  i n d i r e c t l y  through a  s lowing  o f  economic growth.  
While h i g h  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  may b e  s a i d  t o  have t h e  
e f f e c t  o f  s lowing  b o t h  i n f l a t i o n  and t h e  growth o f  employment, t h e y  a l s o  have  t h e  
e f f e c t  o f  e x p o r t i n g  jobs  and i n f l a t i o n .  A l a r g e  r e d u c t i o n  i n U . S .  n e t  e x p o r t s  h a s ,  
a s  i t s  m i r r o r  image, an i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  n e t  e x p o r t s  o f  o u r  t r a d i n g  p a r t n e r s .  The 
s t i m u l u s  l o s t  by t h e  U.S. economy i s  t h e r e f o r e  t r a n s f e r r e d  e l sewhere .  While t h e  
r e d u c t i o n  i n  U.S. e x p o r t s  c r e a t e s  jobs  abroad,  i t  a l s o  adds t o  i n f l a t i o n  abroad because  
o f  h i g h e r  l e v e l s  o f  a g g r e g a t e  demand and because  t h e  r i s e  i n  t h e  U .S .  exchange r a t e  
h a s  g r e a t l y  i n c r e a s e d  t h e  c o s t  o f  impor t s  from t h e  U.S. The r e c e s s i o n  o f  1981-82 
was worldwide as i n d u s t r i a l  p r o d u c t i o n  s l i p p e d  i n  1982 i n  t h e  European Economic 
Community (EEC)  as w e l l  as i n  Japan  and e l sewhere .  However, t h e  d e c l i n e  i n  t h e  
European i n f l a t i o n  r a t e  was n o t  n e a r l y  as pronounced as i n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s .  For  
example, t h e  r a t e  o f  i n c r e a s e  i n  consumer p r i c e s  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  d e c l i n e d  from 
10.4 p e r c e n t  i n  1981 t o  6 . 1  p e r c e n t  i n  1982. However, i n  t h e  EEC t h e  i n f l a t i o n  r a t e  
dropped o n l y  t o  9 .6  p e r c e n t  i n  1982 from a  r a t e  of 11 .5  p e r c e n t  i n  1981. A p o r t i o n  
o f  t h e  improved i n f l a t i o n  performance o f  t h e  U .  S.  economy i s  t h e r e f o r e  a t t r i b u t a b l e  
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t o  exchange- ra te  and b a l a n c e  o f  payments developments .  A s  such ,  t h e  improve- 
ment r e p r e s e n t s  a  t r a n s f e r  t h a t  may w e l l  be  r e v e r s e d  i f  t h e  d o l l a r  d e c l i n e s  
because  o f  a  narrowing o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  o r  
f o r  some o t h e r  c a u s e .  
R i s i n g  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s ,  which a r e  i n  p a r t  caused by h i g h  budget  d e f i c i t s ,  
a l s o  add t o  t h e  budget  d e f i c i t s  o f  government a t  a l l  l e v e l s .  I n t e r e s t  r a t e s  
p a i d  on F e d e r a l  government o b l i g a t i o n s  began t h e i r  r e c e n t  e s c  a1 a t  i o n  i n  1978. 
F e d e r a l  d e b t  h e l d  by t h e  p u b l i c  t o t a l l e d  $551.8  b i l l i o n  i n  F i s c a l  Year (FYI 1977. 
By FY 1983 i t  had i n c r e a s e d  106.9 p e r c e n t  t o  a  l e v e l  o f  $1,141.8  b i l l i o n .  
I n t e r e s t  p a i d  on t h i s  d e b t  i n c r e a s e d  even more r a p i d l y ,  r i s i n g  191.0  p e r c e n t ,  
from $29.9 b i l l i o n  t o  $87.0 b i l l i o n .  The average r a t e  o f  i n t e r e s t  p a i d  on 
t h e  d e b t  i n  FY 1977 was 5 . 4  p e r c e n t  as compared w i t h  7 .6  p e r c e n t  i n  N 1983. 
Had t h e  FY 1983 d e b t  been f i n a n c e d  a t  t h e  N 1977 r a t e ,  t h e r e  would have  
been a  s a v i n g  i n  budget  o u t l a y s  o f  $25.3  b i l l i o n ,  o r  almost o n e - t h i r d  o f  
c u r r e n t  i n t e r e s t  c o s t s ,  The e s t i m a t e d  FY 1984 d e b t  o f  roughly  $1,339 b i l l i o n  
i m p l i e s  an i n t e r e s t  c o s t  of $13 b i l l i o n  f o r  e v e r y  p e r c e n t a g e  p o i n t  o f  i n t e r e s t  
p a i d .  

111. THE CAUSES OF H I G H  INTEREST RATES 
A.  C o n d i t i o n s  f o r  S t a b l e  I n t e r e s t  R a t e s  
The a c i d  t e s t  o f  any argument t o  e x p l a i n  a  r i s e  i n  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  i s :  
d o e s  t h e  proposed c a u s e  d i s r u p t  "monetary e q u i l i b r i u m ' '  i n  a  way t h a t  r a i s e s  t h e  
demand f o r  money r e l a t i v e  t o  i t s  s u p p l y ?  A major  f a c t o r  d e t e r m i n i n g  t h e  demand 
f o r  money i s  t h e  l e v e l  o f  t o t a l  s p e n d i n g  i n  t h e  economy. Any f a c t o r  ( o t h e r  t h a n  
a d e c l i n e  i n  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s )  t h a t  i n c r e a s e s  t o t a l  spend ing  t e n d s ,  s i m u l t a n e o u s l y ,  
t o  r a i s e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  
Monetary e q u i l i b r i u m  a l s o  i m p l i e s  t h a t  t h e  s u p p l i e s  o f  o t h e r  p o r t f o l i o  
a s s e t s  a r e  i n  b a l a n c e  w i t h  t h e i r  demands. The two c o n d i t i o n s  must b e  s imul -  
t aneous ly  ach ieved .  I f  p e o p l e  f e e l  t h a t  t h e i r  p o r t  f o l i o s  a r e  o v e r s t o c k e d  
w i t h  money, t h e y  must a l s o  f e e l  t h e y  a r e  unders tocked  w i t h  o t h e r  p o r t f o l i o  
a s s e t s .  T h i s  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  s t a b l e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  i s  c e n t r a l  t o  subsequen t  
d i s c u s s i o n ,  e s p e c i a l l y  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  S e c t i o n  111-D. 
The c o n d i t i o n  t h a t  t h e  s u p p l i e s  o f  p o r t f o l i o  a s s e t s  b e  e q u a l  t o  t h e i r  
demands i m p l i e s  t h a t  t o t a l  n a t i o n a l  s a v i n g  must e q u a l  t o t a l  i n v e s t m e n t ,  s i n c e  
o t h e r w i s e  t h e r e  would b e  an e x c e s s  ( o r  d e f i c i e n c y )  o f  bonds and o t h e r  f i n a n c i a l  
a s s e t s  r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e i r  demand. P r i v a t e  s a v i n g ,  which r e p r e s e n t s  unconsumed 
income, c o n s t i t u t e s  a  demand f o r  f i n a n c i a l  a s s e t s  such as new s e c u r i t i e s .  
I n v e s t m e n t ,  c o n v e r s e l y ,  p r o v i d e s  a  s u p p l y  o f  new s e c u r i t i e s .  When t h e  government 
r u n s  a  budge t  d e f i c i t ,  i t  adds t o  t h e  s u p p l y  o f  s e c u r i t i e s  t h a t  must be  f i n a n c e d ,  
t h e  d e f i c i t  b e i n g  r e g a r d e d  as a  n e g a t i v e  component o f  n a t i o n a l  s a v i n g .  
B.  Supply  Shocks a s  a  Cause o f  High I n t e r e s t  R a t e s  
The f o c u s  o f  a t t e n t i o n  i n  r e c e n t  e x p l a n a t i o n s  o f  h i g h  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  h a s  
been on mone ta ry  p o l i c y  and t h e  budget  d e f i c i t .  However, t h e  i n i t i a l  b u r s t  of  
h i g h e r  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  t h a t  began i n  mid-1979 seems t o  have had ,  a s  i t s  p r imary  
d r i v i n g  f o r c e ,  t h e  second major  round of  world  o i l  p r i c e  i n c r e a s e s .  
Supply  s h o c k s ,  s u c h  a s  a  r i s e  i n  t h e  p r i c e  o f  o i l ,  a  r e d u c t i o n  i n  a g r i c u l -  
t u r a l  s u p p l i e s  caused  by poor h a r v e s t s ,  o r  s u c h  l e s s  s p e c t a c u l a r  b u t  i m p o r t a n t  
deve lopments  a s  i n c r e a s e s  i n  i n d i r e c t  t a x e s  and l e g a l  minimum wages,  have  i n  
common t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  t h a t  a f t e r  t h e i r  o c c u r r e n c e  t h e  economy c a n  no l o n g e r  
p roduce  e x i s t i n g  o u t p u t  l e v e l s  a t  p r e - e x i s t i n g  p r i c e  l e v e l s .  The upward 
push i n  t h e  p r i c e  l e v e l  t h a t  f o l l o w s  s u c h  a  shock h a s  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  r e d u c i n g  t h e  
p u r c h a s i n g  power v a l u e  o f  t h e  money s t o c k .  Economists  c a l l  t h i s  a  r e d u c t i o n  i n  
t h e  r e a l  q u a n t i t y  o f  money, o r  t h e  r e a l  v a l u e  of  t h e  money s u p p l y .  S i n c e  t h e  
s u p p l y  of  money d e c l i n e s  i n  r e a l  t e rms  r e l a t i v e  t o  i t s  demand, i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  
a r e  f o r c e d  up.  Pu t  d i f f e r e n t l y ,  e x i s t i n g  nominal  money b a l a n c e s  a r e  no l o n g e r  
a d e q u a t e  t o  f i n a n c e  t h e  same l e v e l  of economic a c t i v i t y  a t  t h e  new h i g h e r  p r i c e  
l e v e l .  Wealth h o l d e r s  must  t h e n  a t t e m p t  t o  supplement  t h e i r  money h o l d i n g s  by 
s e l l i n g  s u c h  a s s e t s  a s  bonds o r  by t a k i n g  o u t  l o a n s .  These r e s p o n s e s  mean t h a t  
i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  must  r i s e  because  of  t h e  c o m p e t i t i o n  f o r  f u n d s .  
Rea l  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  c o u l d  b e  p reven ted  from r i s i n g  by a  monetary  p o l i c y  t h a t  
accommodates t h e  i n f l a t i o n  i n  a  manner t h a t  m a i n t a i n s  growth o f  t h e  r e a l  q u a n t i t y  
o f  money. But t h a t  i s  a s k i n g  t h e  F e d e r a l  Xeserve t o  r a i s e  t h e  r a t e  of  monetary  
g rowth  a t  a  t i m e  o f  a c c e l e r a t i n g  i n f l a t i o n .  The F e d e r a l  Rese rve  d i d  n o t  p r o v i d e  
such  accommodation i n  1979.  While nominal  P l l  and d2 grew a t  r a t e s  of 7.7 and 
8.3  p e r c e n t  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  t h e  r a p i d  i n f l a t i o n  i m p l i e d  a  d e c l i n e  i n  t h e  r e a l  
v a l u e s  o f  t h e s e  magni tudes  of -0.1 and -0.4 p e r c e n t  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  Monetary 
growth r a t e s ,  b o t h  nominal and r e a l ,  a r e  shown i n  Tab le  1. 
Tab le  1 
MONETARY GROWTH RATES* 
(PERCENTS) 
YEAR NOMINAL REAL** 
* Honey s u p p l y  f i g u r e s  a r e  a n n u a l  a v e r a g e s .  
** Real  money s u p p l y  measures  a r e  c a l c u l a t e d  by d e f l a t i n g  nominal v a l u e s  
by t h e  i m p l i c i t  p r i c e  d e f l a t o r  f o r  Gross  N a t i o n a l  P r o d u c t .  
Source:  Board of Governors o f  t h e  F e d e r a l  Reserve System and Department o f  
Commerce. 
C .  Monetary-Fiscal  P o l i c i e s  and High I n t e r e s t  R a t e s  
Most o b s e r v e r s  a t t r i b u t e  t h e  c o n t i n u a t i o n  of h i g h  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  p r i m a r i l y  
t o  t h e  mass ive  s h i f t s  i n  monetary  and f i s c a l  p o l i c i e s  t h a t  began i n  1979.  
T h i s  s h i f t  h a s  c o n s i s t e d  of a  combina t ion  of e x p a n s i o n a r y  f i s c a l  measures ,  
i n c l u d i n g  e x p e n d i t u r e  expans ion  and t a x  r e d u c t i o n ,  a l o n g  w i t h  a mone ta ry  p o l i c y  
t h a t  a t  t i m e s  h a s  been h a r s h l y  r e s t r i c t i v e .  Var ious  measures ,  d e s i g n e d  t o  show 
t h i s  s h i f t  i n  p o l i c i e s ,  a r e  shown i n  Tab le  2 .  
T a b l e  2  
MEASURES OF MONETARY AND FISCAL IMPACT 
REAL GROWTH RATIO TO KATIO TO 




* Calendar  y e a r s ,  b i l l i o n s  o f  d o l l a r s .  
S o u r c e :  Economic I n d i c a t o r s .  For e s t i m a t e s  of  s t r u c t u r a l  d e f i c i t s ,  U.S. 
Department of  Commerce. Bureau of Economic A n a l y s i s .  Survey  of  
C u r r e n t  B u s i n e s s .  The High Employment Budget:  Revised E s t i m a t e s  and 
Automat ic  I n f l a t i o n  E f f e c t s  by Frank d e  Leeuw and Thomas M. Holloway. 
A p r i l ,  1982.  
An e x p a n s i o n a r y  f i s c a l  p o l i c y  s u c h  a s  a  t a x  r e d u c t i o n  t e n d s  t o  r a i s e  i n -  
t e r e s t  r a t e s  b e c a u s e  t h e  i n c r e a s e d  volume of F e d e r a l  d e b t  i n  need of f i n a n c i n g  
i s  o n l y  p a r t i a l l y  o f f s e t  by i n c r e a s e d  s a v i n g  i n  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  o f  t h e  
economy. Consequen t ly ,  t h e  demand and s u p p l y  p r e s s u r e s  i n  s e c u r i t y  m a r k e t s  
f o r c e  bond p r i c e s  down and i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  up.  An a l t e r n a t i v e ,  and e q u i v a l e n t ,  
way t o  l o o k  a t  t h e  m a t t e r  i s  t o  n o t e  t h a t  e x p a n s i o n a r y  f i s c a l  p o l i c y  r a i s e s  
t o t a l  spend ing  i n  t h e  economy and t h e r e f o r e  i n c r e a s e s  t h e  demand f o r  money and 
c r e d i t ,  t h e r e b y  f o r c i n g  up i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  
R e s t r i c t i v e  mone ta ry  p o l i c y  i s  u s u a l l y  conducted by t h e  s a l e  o f  government 
s e c u r i t i e s  on t h e  open market  by t h e  F e d e r a l  Reserve  sys tem.  T h i s  i n c r e a s e s  
t h e  s u p p l y  of s e c u r i t i e s  t h a t  must be  absorbed i n  p r i v a t e  m a r k e t s  much a s  i n  
t h e  manner of a n  e x p a n s i o n a r y  f i s c a l  p o l i c y .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  money s u p p l y  i s  
reduced .  P o r t f o l i o  r e a d j u s t m e n t  t h e n  r a i s e s  t h e  p r i c e  o f  t h e  r e l a t i v e l y  s c a r c e  
a s s e t  (money) and r e d u c e s  t h e  p r i c e s  o f  t h e  r e l a t i v e l y  more p l e n t i f u l  a s s e t s  
( s e c u r i t i e s )  and t h i s  means t h a t  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  r i s e .  
F i s c a l  p o l i c y  became s h a r p l y  e x p a n s i o n a r y  i n  1982. Higher  F e d e r a l  
e x p e n d i t u r e s  r e f l e c t  t h e  d e f e n s e  b u i l d u p ,  r i s i n g  i n t e r e s t  c o s t s ,  and growth o f  
e n t i t l e m e n t  programs. At t h e  same t i m e ,  r evenues  f e l l  i n  r e s p o n s e  t o  t h e  
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981. A  l a r g e  f r a c t i o n  o f  r e c e n t  d e f i c i t s  i s  
t h e  consequence of r e c e s s i o n .  But even a f t e r  a l lowance  f o r  r e c e s s i o n  t h e r e  
h a s  been a n  enormous r i s e  i n  t h e  s o - c a l l e d  s t r u c t u r a l  d e f i c i t .  A r u l e  o f  thumb 
which p e r m i t s  t h i s  d e f i c i t  t o  be  q u i c k l y  e s t i m a t e d  i s  t h a t  r evenue  l o s t  t o  t h e  
T r e a s u r y  per  one  p e r c e n t a g e  p o i n t  o f  unemployment comes t o  r o u g h l y  $18 b i l l i o n  
a n n u a l l y .  A t  t h e  same t i m e ,  h i g h e r  e x p e n d i t u r e s ,  p r i m a r i l y  on unemployment 
compensat ion,  add $6 b i l l i o n  t o  t h e  d e f i c i t .  U t i l i z i n g  a  5.1 p e r c e n t  unemploy- 
ment r a t e  a s  i t s  "benchmark" o r  " h i g h  employment" s t a n d a r d ,  t h e  Commerce 
Department e s t i m a t e d  a  s t r u c t u r a l  d e f i c i t  o f  o n l y  $2.6 b i l l i o n  f o r  1981. 4 /  - 
However, t h e  same, s t a n d a r d  a p p l i e d  t o  1982 y i e l d s  a  s t r u c t u r a l  d e f i c i t  o f  
$37.2 b i l l i o n  and a n  a n n u a l  r a t e  o f  $62.2 b i l l i o n  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  t h r e e  q u a r t e r s  
of 1983. A s  a  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  GNP,  t h e s e  d e f i c i t s  have r i s e n  from a  n e g l i g i b l e  
amount i n  1981 t o  1 .2  p e r c e n t  i n  1982 and 1 .9  p e r c e n t  i n  1983. According t o  
p r o j e c t i o n s  by t h e  C o n g r e s s i o n a l  Budget O f f i c e ,  t h e  s t r u c t u r a l  d e f i c i t s ,  b o t h  
i n  a b s o l u t e  t e r m s  and a s  a  p e r c e n t a g e  of GNP, w i l l  c o n t i n u e  t o  widen i f  c u r r e n t  
4 /  U.S. Department of Commerce. Bureau o f  Economic A n a l y s i s .  Survey o f  - 
C u r r e n t  Bus iness .  The High Employment Budget: Revised E s t i m a t e s  and Automatic 
I n f l a t i o n  E f f e c t s  by Frank d e  Leeuw and Thomas M. Holloway. A p r i l ,  1982. 
f i s c a l  p o l i c i e s  a r e  c o n t i n u e d .  T h i s  i m p l i e s  t h a t  f i s c a l  p o l i c y  w i l l  become 
p r o g r e s s i v e l y  more e x p a n s i o n a r y  a s  t h e  economy c o n t i n u e s  t o  r e c o v e r  and i t  
s u g g e s t s  t h a t  t h e r e  w i l l  be c o n t i n u i n g  upward p r e s s u r e  on i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  5 /  - 
U n l i k e  f i s c a l  p o l i c y ,  i n  which changes  i n  t h e  s t r u c t u r a l  d e f i c i t  s e r v e  a s  
g e n e r a l l y  a c c e p t e d  measures  of  t h e  d e g r e e  o f  f i s c a l  e a s i n g  o r  t i g h t e n i n g ,  t h e r e  
i s  no s i m p l e  and w i d e l y  a c c e p t e d  measure  of monetary  t i g h t n e s s .  Sometimes 
i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  themse lves  a r e  used t o  i n d i c a t e  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  o f  mone ta ry  p o l i c y .  
But t h i s  measure  c a n n o t  i s o l a t e  t h e  e f f e c t  of monetary  p o l i c y  because  i n t e r e s t  
r a t e s  a r e  s u b j e c t  t o  many o t h e r  i n f l u e n c e s .  Another measure  i s  t h e  r a t e  of  
mone ta ry  g rowth .  But nominal  r a t e s  o f  money growth may be  m i s l e a d i n g .  I f  
i n f l a t i o n  i s  advanc ing  r a p i d l y ,  t h e  f i n a n c i n g  p rov ided  by a  f a i r l y  h i g h  r a t e  o f  
mone ta ry  growth w i l l  be  soaked up i n  t h e  f i n a n c i n g  of i n f l a t i o n ,  l e a v i n g  l i t t l e  
room f o r  t h e  f i n a n c i n g  o f  r e a l  growth.  I f  i n f l a t i o n  i s  low,  t h e  same r a t e  o f  
nominal  money growth may b e  h i g h l y  e x p a n s i o n a r y  s i n c e  i t  t h e n  i m p l i e s  t h e  a v a i l a -  
b i l i t y  of  f i n a n c i n g  f o r  r e a l  o u t p u t  growth.  To e l i m i n a t e  t h e  e f f e c t  of  i n f l a t i o n ,  
i t  i s  h e l p f u l  t o  i n s p e c t  t h e  growth of t h e  r e a l  q u a n t i t y  o f  money, t h a t  i s ,  
t h e  nominal  q u a n t i t y  of  money d i v i d e d  by a n  i n d e x  o f  p r i c e s  s u c h  a s  t h e  i m p l i c i t  
p r i c e  d e f l a t o r  f o r  GNP. Even h e r e  t h e r e  may b e  m i s l e a d i n g  s i g n a l s  b e c a u s e  o f  
5 1  C o n s i d e r a b l e  d i s p u t e  s u r r o u n d s  t h e  s e l e c t i o n  of  a n  a p p r o p r i a t e  
benchGark unemployment r a t e .  Presumably,  t h i s  r a t e  shou ld  r e f l e c t  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  
i n  l a b o r  m a r k e t s  conduc ive  t o  wage s t a b i l i t y  i n  t h e  s e n s e  t h a t  wage changes  on 
t h e  a v e r a g e  a r e  no g r e a t e r  and no l e s s  t h a n  t h e  growth o f  l a b o r  p r o d u c t i v i t y .  
I n  t h e  1983 Economic Repor t  of  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  t h e  Counc i l  of Economic A d v i s e r s  
s u g g e s t s  t h a t  t h e  benchmark may be  a s  h i g h  a s  6 . 5  p e r c e n t ,  a l t h o u g h  6 p e r c e n t  
seems more a p p r o p r i a t e l y  t o  r e f l e c t  t h e  consensus  among economis t s  and i s  t h e  
r a t e  u t i l i z e d  by t h e  C o n g r e s s i o n a l  Budget O f f i c e  i n  i t s  r e p o r t ,  The Economic 
O u t l o o k ,  F e b r u a r y  1984.  With a  6  p e r c e n t  benchmark unemployment r a t e ,  t h e  
c y c l i c a l  component o f  t h e  d e f i c i t  i s  reduced by abou t  $21.5 b i l l i o n ,  and t h i s  
amount i s  added t o  t h e  e s t i m a t e d  s t r u c t u r a l  d e f i c i t .  Consequen t ly ,  t h e  e s t i n a t e d  
s t r u c t u r a l  d e f i c i t s  r e p o r t e d  i n  T a b l e  2 would r i s e  from $37 .2  b i l l i o n  t o  $58.7 
b i l l i o n  f o r  1982 and from $62.2 b i l l i o n  t o  $83.7 b i l l i o n  f o r  1983.  
t h e  p o s s i b l e  p r e s e n c e  of e r r a t i c  changes i n  t h e  v e l o c i t y  o f  c i r c u l a t i o n  of  money. 
The measures  shown i n  T a b l e  2  u t i l i z e  M2 a s  t h e  monetary  a g g r e g a t e .  The v e l o c i t y  
o f  M2 i s  somewhat more s t a b l e  t h a n  t h e  v e l o c i t y  of  MI, and i t  e x h i b i t s  no l o n g  
r u n  t r e n d .  Moreover,  M2 i s  a  b r o a d e r  and more i n c l u s i v e  measure  o f  money s u p p l y .  
Assuming t h a t  t h e  growth of  p o t e n t i a l  GNP i s  a p p r o x i m a t e l y  3  p e r c e n t ,  a  
growth of  r e a l  M2 i n  t h a t  g e n e r a l  neighborhood would b e  r e q u i r e d  t o  f i n a n c e  
such GNP growth a t  s t a b l e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  - 6/  By t h i s  s t a n d a r d ,  ~ o n e t a r y  
p o l i c y  became r e s t r i c t i v e  i n  1979 a s  r e a l  ?,I% d e c l i n e d  by 0 .4  p e r c e n t .  h o n e t a r y  
p o l i c y  remained t i g h t  i n  1980 and 1981 showing r e a l  changes  o f  -1.0 p e r c e n t  
and 0 . 2  p e r c e n t  i n  t h e  r e s p e c t i v e  y e a r s .  P o l i c y  t h e n  appeared  t o  r e t u r n  t o  a  
t r a c k  d e s i g n e d  t o  f i n a n c e  r e a l  economic growth w i t h  r e a l  money growth o f  3 .2  
p e r c e n t  i n  1982 and 8 . 1  p e r c e n t  i n  1583.  
A measure  t h a t  p r o v i d e s  a  d i f f e r e n t  p e r s p e c t i v e  by s u g g e s t i n g  how much room 
f o r  growth monetary  p o l i c y  i s  p r o v i d i n g  i s  t h e  r a t i o  o f  money s t o c k  t o  GNP. The 
r a t i o  s t o o d  a t  0.619 i n  1978.  It f e l l  d r a s t i c a l l y  t o  0.600 i n  1979 and a g a i n  i n  
1981. It t h e n  r e c o v e r e d  t o  0 .611  i n  1982 and 0 .639  i n  1983.  
Although t h i s  cash-ba lance  r a t i o  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  monetary  p o l i c y  i s  a g a i n  on 
a t r a c k  d e s i g n e d  t o  f i n a n c e  r e a l  growth a t  s t a b l e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s ,  t h i s  i s  sorxe- 
what m i s l e a d i n g .  T igh t  money r e d u c e s  t h e  growth o f  GNP; t h u s  t h e  s lower  growth 
of  t h e  numerator  o f  t h e  cash-ba lance  r a t i o  s lows  t h e  denomina to r  o f  t h e  r a t i o  a s  
w e l l .  A more i n s t r u c t i v e  measure of  t h e  s h o r t f a l l  o f  money s u p p l y  i s  t h e  r a t i o  
of  money t o  p o t e n t i a l  GNP, i . e . ,  t h e  GNP l e v e l  t h a t  i s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  t h e  
6 /  The assumpt ion  of  t h e  t e x t  t h a t  s t a b l e  i n t s r e s t  r a t e s  a r e  i m p l i e d  
by growth i n  r e a l  M2 a t  a  r a t e  e q u a l  t o  t h e  growth o f  p o t e n t i a l  GNP i s  a  rough 
approx imat ion  t h a t  must be q u a l i f i e d .  I f  i n f l a t i o n  i s  advanc ing  r a p i d l y  t h e  
r e a l  v a l u e  of  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r ' s  n e t  c l a i m s  a g a i n s t  t h e  government d i m i n i s h e s .  
Consequen t ly ,  i n f l a t  i o n  i m p l i e s  a  "weal th  e f f e c t "  t h a t  makes t h e  p r i v a t e  
s e c t o r  p o o r e r .  T h i s ,  i n  t u r n ,  t e n d s  t o  r e d u c e  spend ing  by househo lds  t h e r e b y  
t e n d i n g  t o  d e p r e s s  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  Such a n  e f f e c t  would,  of  c o u r s e ,  b e  a b s e n t  
i f  t h e r e  i s  no i n f l a t i o n .  Thus t h e  same r a t e  of r e a l  money growth may imply 
d i f f e r e n t  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  a t  d i f f e r e n t  i n f l a t i o n  r a t e s .  Such w e a l t h  e f f e c t s  and 
t h e i r  i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  a r e  d i s c u s s e d  i n  S e c t i o n  1 1 1 - D .  
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benchmark unemployment r a t e .  I f  t h a t  r a t i o  i s  d e c l i n i n g  o r  remain ing  low 
r e l a t i v e  t o  an e a r l i e r  p e r i o d ,  i t  can  be i n f e r r e d  t h a t  t h e  growth of money i n  
t h e  economy i s  i n a d e q u a t e  t o  f i n a n c e  a  h i g h  l e v e l  of economic a c t i v i t y  i n  
combina t ion  w i t h  r e a l  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  t h a t  a r e  no h i g h e r  t h a n  a t  a  p r e v i o u s  t i m e  
when a c t u a l  o u t p u t  equa led  p o t e n t i a l  o u t p u t .  
The p o t e n t i a l  GNP e s t i m a t e s  used i n  t h e s e  c a l c u l a t i o n s  d e r i v e  from Okun's 
Law. According t o  t h i s  well-known r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  a  one-percentage-point  i n c r e a s e  
i n  t h e  unemployment r a t e  above a  benchmark l e v e l  of 5 .1  p e r c e n t  i m p l i e s  a  s h o r t -  
f a l l  of  a c t u a l  GNP below p o t e n t i a l  GNP of 2 .1  p e r c e n t .  E s t i m a t e s  of t h e  r a t i o  
of M 2  t o  p o t e n t i a l  GNP d e r i v e d  i n  t h i s  manner show a  r a t i o  of 0.608 i n  1978. T h i s  
d e c l i n e d  s h a r p l y  o v e r  t h r e e  y e a r s  t o  0 .551 i n  1981. Unl ike  t h e  r a t i o  of M2 t o  
a c t u a l  GNP, which i n c r e a s e d  i n  1982 because  o f  meager growth i n  GNP, t h e  r a t i o  of 
M2 t o  p o t e n t i a l  GNP remained r o u g h l y  c o n s t a n t  i n  1982. The r a t i o  f i n a l l y  began t o  
r i s e  i n  1983. However, i t s  l e v e l  of 0.581 l e f t  i t  f a r  below t h e  0.608 r a t i o  o f  
1978. A r a t i o  of ?I2 t o  p o t e n t i a l  GNP e q u a l  t o  t h a t  of 1978 would imply a n  M2 l e v e l  
4.7 p e r c e n t  h i g h e r  t h a n  t h e  a c t u a l  l e v e l  o f  1983. T h i s  i m p l i e s  a  v e r y  s u b s t a n t i a l  
.. . ~ m p l i c i t "  money gap from t h e  l e v e l s  t h a t  would be needed t o  f i n a n c e  p o t e n t i a l  
GNP a t  1 9 7 8 ' s  r e a l  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  
The i m p l i c i t  money gap  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  h i g h e r  r a t e s  o f  monetary  growth from 
a  low b a s e  may be s u f f i c i e n t  t o  f i n a n c e  t h e  r e c o v e r y  o f  G N P ,  b u t  t h e y  a r e  i n s u f -  
f i c i e n t  t o  do s o  excep t  a t  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  t h a t  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  remain h i g h e r  t h a n  
a t  l e v e l s  p r i o r  t o  t h e  r e c e n t  c y c l e .  Pu t  d i f f e r e n t l y ,  a  d r a s t i c  r e t a r d a t i o n  i n  
money growth ,  s u c h  a s  o c c u r r e d  between 1978 and 1981,  may r e d u c e  t h e  nominal 
money s t o c k  permanent ly  r e l a t i v e  t o  p o t e n t i a l  GNP. The economy i n i t i a l l y  a d j u s t s  
t o  such  a  s h o r t a g e  by b i d d i n g  up t h e  c o s t  of money. However, i n  t h e  l o n g e r  r u n ,  
most economists  would a g r e e  t h a t  i t s  pr imary e f f e c t  would be t o  r e d u c e  t h e  
r a t e  of i n f l a t i o n .  
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D .  I n t e r e s t  R a t e s  and t h e  R e l a t i v e  S u p p l i e s  of F i n a n c i a l  A s s e t s  
A n a l y s i s  of t h e  k ind  conducted i n  t h e  p r e v i o u s  s e c t i o n  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  i n  
t h e  absence  o f  n a t i o n a l  income growth ,  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  w i l l  t e n d  t o  r emain  con- 
s t a n t  p rov ided  t h e  s u p p l y  of money and t h e  l e v e l  of t h e  budget  d e f i c i t  remain  
t h e  same. I n  t h i s  c a s e  f i s c a l  p o l i c y  adds  i d e n t i c a l  amounts of s t i m u l u s  i n  
s u c c e s s i v e  p e r i o d s .  I f  t h e  demand f o r  money i s  p r i m a r i l y  a  f u n c t i o n  of t h e  
l e v e l  of  income and t h e  r a t e  of  i n t e r e s t ,  a  c o n s t a n t  money s u p p l y  would p e r m i t  
t h e  demand f o r  money t o  be equa ted  w i t h  i t s  s u p p l y  a t  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  t h a t  
remain t h e  same. 
The c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  what might  be d e s c r i b e d  a s  a n  " i n t e r e s t - n e u t r a l "  p o l i c y  
s t a n c e  a s  between two p e r i o d s  i s  more compl ica ted  i n  an  environment  o f  economic 
g rowth .  I n  t h a t  e v e n t  a b u d g e t a r y  s t a n c e  t h a t  m a i n t a i n s  c o n s t a n t  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  
i m p l i e s  a s t r u c t u r a l  d e f i c i t  t h a t  r emains  c o n s t a n t  r e l a t i v e  t o  GNP. S i m i l a r l y ,  
an  i n t e r e s t - n e u t r a l  monetary  p o l i c y  i s  a  p o l i c y  t h a t  f i n a n c e s  t h e  growth o f  GNP. 
I n  t h e  c a s e  of  M 2 ,  which shows no s e c u l a r  v e l o c i t y  change ,  t h i s  i m p l i e s  a  r a t e  
of Pl2 growth e q u a l  t o  t h e  r a t e  of  growth o f  GNP. I n  t h e  c a s e  of MI which h a s  
shown a  t r e n d  r a t e  o f  v e l o c i t y  i n c r e a s e  of  about  3 p e r c e n t  a n n u a l l y ,  t h i s  i m p l i e s  
a  r a t e  of MI growth t h a t  i s  3 p e r c e n t  l e s s  t h a n  t h e  growth of  nominal  GNP. 
Presumably ,  t h e  demand f o r  money grows a t  t h e s e  r a t e s  and t h a t ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  i n d i -  
c a t e s  t h e  r a t e s  a t  which t h e  money s t o c k  measures  must grow i n  o r d e r  t o  m a i n t a i n  
c o n s t a n t  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  
The above a r e  t h e  r e s u l t s  p r e d i c t e d  by c o n v e n t i o n a l  macroeconomic a n a l y s i s .  
They a r e  based on t h e  n o t i o n  t h a t  t h e  demand f o r  money depends  on t h e  l e v e l  of  
n a t i o n a l  income and t h e  r a t e  o f  i n t e r e s t .  A r i s e  i n  n a t i o n a l  income i n c r e a s e s  t h e  
amount of money needed t o  s u p p o r t  a d d i t i o n a l  b u s i n e s s  and household  t r a n s a c t i o n s .  
A r i s e  i n  t h e  r a t e  of  i n t e r e s t  i n c r e a s e s  t h e  c o s t  of h o l d i n g  i d l e  money b a l a n c e s  
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j u s t  a s  i t  i n c r e a s e s  t h e  c o s t  o f  h o l d i n g  any o t h e r  s t o c k  of i n v e n t o r y .  T h i s  
h i g h e r  c o s t  c a u s e s  w e a l t h  h o l d e r s  w i t h  s u b s t a n t i a l  money h o l d i n g s  t o  c o n v e r t  
p o r t i o n s  of t h e s e  h o l d i n g s  i n t o  e a r n i n g  a s s e t s .  The r e s u l t ,  i s  t o  reduce  t h e  
q u a n t i t y  o f  money demanded. R e f l e c t e d  i n  a c t u a l  b e h a v i o r ,  t h i s  means lower  
a v e r a g e  c a s h  b a l a n c e s  r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  volume of t r a n s a c t i o n s ;  which i s  t h e  same 
a s  s a y i n g ,  a  h i g h e r  v e l o c i t y ,  o r  r a t e  o f  t u r n o v e r ,  of money. 
Many s t u d e n t s  of t h e  demand f o r  money c o n s i d e r  t h i s  e x p l a n a t i o n  t o  b e  
i n c o m p l e t e .  They b e g i n  w i t h  t h e  i d e a  t h a t  t h e  d e c i s i o n  t o  ho ld  money i s  a 
p o r t f o l i o  d e c i s i o n .  Money i n  t h i s  v iew i s  h e l d  a s  a n  a s s e t  a l o n g  w i t h  o t h e r  
a s s e t s  v a r y i n g  by d e g r e e  of r i s k ,  r e t u r n ,  and l i q u i d i t y .  The t y p i c a l  i n v e s t o r  
i s  assumed t o  be a  p o r t f o l i o  d i v e r s i f i e r  who h o l d s  a  wide spec t rum of a s s e t s  
i n c l u d i n g  money. The l a t t e r  i s  h e l d  because  t h e  low r i s k  a t t a c h e d  t o  money 
h o l d i n g  o f f s e t s  t h e  absence  of r e t u r n .  Should i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  r i s e ,  t h e  market  
t h e n  s u p p l i e s  a  more f a v o r a b l e  r a t e  a t  which h i g h e r  r i s k  c a n  be  c o n v e r t e d  i n t o  
r e t u r n .  The w e a l t h  h o l d e r  t a k e s  advan tage  of t h e  s i t u a t i o n  by c o n v e r t i n g  some 
of h i s  money h o l d i n g s  i n t o  e a r n i n g  a s s e t s ,  a d j u s t i n g  h i s  p o r t f o l i o  i n  a  manner 
t h a t  c a u s e s  him t o  assume more r i s k  i n  r e t u r n  f o r  h i g h e r  e a r n i n g s .  
An i m p o r t a n t  i m p l i c a t i o n  of t h e  modern t h e o r y  of t h e  demand f o r  money, o r  
l i q u i d i t y  p r e f e r e n c e  a s  i t  i s  f r e q u e n t l y  c a l l e d ,  i s  t h a t  a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  w e a l t h  
w i l l  c a u s e  a w e a l t h  h o l d e r  t o  d i s t r i b u t e  h i s  a d d i t i o n a l  w e a l t h  i n  a  d i v e r s i f i e d  
manner. I f  a  w e a l t h  h o l d e r  i s  g i v e n  more money, he  w i l l  wish t o  keep o n l y  p a r t  
of i t ,  u s i n g  t h e  remainder  t o  purchase  o t h e r  a s s e t s .  Converse ly ,  i f  he i s  g i v e n  
more o f  a  d i f f e r e n t  a s s e t ,  such  a s  bonds ,  he  w i l l  wish t o  keep o n l y  p a r t  o f  t h e  
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a d d i t i o n a l  bonds ,  c o n v e r t i n g  t h e  remainder  i n t o  o t h e r  a s s e t s  i n c l u d i n g  money. - 7 /  
T h i s  r e a s o n i n g  s u p p l i e s  a n o t h e r  i m p o r t a n t  way i n  which f i s c a l  p o l i c y  may 
a f f e c t  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  I n  c o n v e n t i o n a l  macroeconomics a  g i v e n  l e v e l  o f  budget  
d e f i c i t  i s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  a g i v e n  l e v e l  o f  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  But t h e  p o r t f o l i o  
approach  t o  t h e  demand f o r  money s u g g e s t s  t h a t  t h i s  may be  i n  e r r o r  because  even  
a  c o n s t a n t  l e v e l  o f  budget  d e f i c i t  changes  t h e  w e a l t h  o f  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  con- 
t i n u o u s l y  a s  new p u b l i c  d e b t  i s  i s s u e d .  
S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  t h e  p r e s e n c e  of a  budget  d e f i c i t  means t h a t  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  
w e a l t h  o f  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  i s  i n c r e a s i n g .  When t h e  government engages  i n  a n  
a c t  o f  spend ing  by drawing down i t s  c a s h  b a l a n c e s ,  t h i s  r e s u l t s  i n  a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  
t h e  money h o l d i n g s  and w e a l t h  o f  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  o f  t h e  economy. I f  t h e  
government r e p l e n i s h e s  i t s  a c c o u n t s  by a n  e q u a l  t a x ,  t h e  f l o w  o f  money and w e a l t h  
a r e  r e v e r s e d .  Consequen t ly ,  a ba lanced  budget  i m p l i e s  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no n e t  f l o w  
of f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  between t h e  p r i v a t e  and t h e  government s e c t o r s .  
If t h e  government r e p l e n i s h e s  i t s  a c c o u n t s  by t h e  s a l e  o f  bonds ,  t h e  w e a l t h  
t r a n s f e r  becomes permanent.  However, t h e  form which t h e  w e a l t h  t r a n s f e r  t a k e s  
depends  on whether  t h e  bonds a r e  s o l d  t o  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  o r  whether  t h e y  a r e  
absorbed  by t h e  F e d e r a l  Reserve.  I n  t h e  l a t t e r  c a s e ,  which i s  c a l l e d  m o n e t i z a t i o n  
of t h e  d e b t ,  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  keeps  t h e  money which i t  r e c e i v e d  from t h e  govern- 
ment e x p e n d i t u r e ,  w h i l e  t h e  F e d e r a l  Reserve r e c e i v e s  t h e  bonds.  I n  t h i s  c a s e  t h e  
budget  d e f i c i t  may have l i t t l e  e f f e c t  on i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  because  t h e  added expen- 
d i t u r e s  by t h e  government,  a s  w e l l  a s  s u b s e q u e n t l y  induced e x p e n d i t u r e s  t h a t  r e s u l t  
from t h e  expans ion  o f  income, a r e  matched by an  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  money s u p p l y  i n  a  
way t h a t  c o u l d  e a s i l y  keep t h e  s u p p l y  of money e q u a l  t o  i t s  demand. 
7 1  The semina l  work i s  Tobin,  James.  L i q u i d i t y  P r e f e r e n c e  a s  Behavior 
~ o w a r d s  Risk .  Review of Economic S t u d i e s ,  1 9 5 8 .  p. 65-86. 
I n t e r e s t  r a t e s  a r e ,  however, v e r y  l i k e l y  t o  r i s e  when a  budget d e f i c i t  i s  
f i n a n c e d  by t h e  s a l e  of bonds t o  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r .  Such a  r i s e  would o c c u r  
even  i f  t h e  d e f i c i t  m e r e l y  remained c o n s t a n t ,  and i t  might  even  be t r u e  i f  t h e  
d e f i c i t  d e c l i n e d  somewhat. Even a  c o n s t a n t  d e f i c i t  from y e a r  t o  y e a r  i m p l i e s  t h a t  
t h e  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  of t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  of t h e  economy i s  i n c r e a s i n g .  I f  t h i s  
i n c r e a s e  i s  i n  t h e  form of  bonds,  w e a l t h  h o l d e r s  who s e e k  t o  d i v e r s i f y  t h e i r  
p o r t f o l i o s  w i l l  wish t o  ho ld  more of a l l  t h e  a s s e t s  i n  t h e i r  p o r t f o l i o s ,  i n c l u d -  
i n g  money. Consequen t ly ,  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  a  budget  d e f i c i t  i m p l i e s  t h a t  t h e  
p o r t f o l i o  demand f o r  money i n c r e a s e s  s o  t h a t  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  w i l l  t end  t o  r i s e .  
Pu t  d i f f e r e n t l y ,  w e a l t h  h o l d e r s  w i l l  a t t e m p t  t o  s u b s t i t u t e  o t h e r  a s s e t s  f o r  some 
of  t h e  new bonds t h e y  r e c e i v e .  S u b s t i t u t i o n  of t h i s  s o r t  d r i v e s  down bond p r i c e s ,  
which i n  t u r n  r a i s e s  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  8 /  - 
T h i s  p o s s i b i l i t y  c a l l s  a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  impor tance  of t h e  r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e s  
of f i n a n c i a l  a s s e t s  i n  d e t e r m i n i n g  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  When t h e s e  s u p p l i e s  do n o t  
f o l l o w  a  p a t h  t h a t  keeps  such a s s e t s  a s  bonds and money growing i n  rough pro- 
p o r t i o n ,  t h e  e f f e c t  on i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  cou ld  be s u b s t a n t i a l .  Between FY 1978 and 
81 The d i s c u s s i o n  f o l l o w s  B l i n d e r ,  Alan S. and Rober t  Pi. Solow. 
~ n a l y r i c a l  Founda t ions  of F i s c a l  P o l i c y ,  i n  The Economics of P u b l i c  F i n a n c e ,  
(Alan S. B l i n d e r ,  e d . ) ,  The Brookings I n s t i t u t i o n ,  1974. See a l s o  Friedman, 
Benjamin N. Crowding Out o r  Crowding I n ?  Economic Consequences of F i n a n c i n g  
Government D e f i c i t s ,  Brookings P a p e r s  on Economic A c t i v i t y ,  v .3 ,  1978. p.  593-654. 
Friedman i s  c r i t i c a l  o f  t h e  Blinder-Solow a n a l y s i s  c l a i m i n g  t h a t  i t  presumes a  
two-asse t  world  where t h e  o n l y  p o r t f o l i o  a s s e t s  a r e  government bonds and money. 
Friedman would add p r i v a t e  c a p i t a l  a s  a  t h i r d  major a s s e t  component. He t h e n  
r e a s o n s  t h a t  t h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  w e a l t h  caused by a  bond f i n a n c e d  d e f i c i t  may 
r a i s e  t h e  demand f o r  c o r p o r a t e  bonds and e q u i t i e s  so  t h a t  t h e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  
r e l e v a n t  t o  c o r p o r a t e  i n v e s t m e n t  d e c i s i o n s  may, i n  f a c t ,  f a l l .  Investment  may 
t h e n  i n c r e a s e  d e s p i t e  a  r i s e  i n  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  on government s e c u r i t i e s .  
However, f o r  t h i s  e f f e c t  t o  produce " p o r t f o l i o  crowding i n " ,  a s  Friedman c a l l s  
i t ,  depends  on t h e  c o n t r o v e r s i a l  a ssumpt ion  t h a t  government bonds and money 
a r e  c l o s e  s u b s t i t u t e s  ( i n  which c a s e  t h e  i n c r e a s e d  w e a l t h  h a s  l i t t l e  impact  on 
t h e  demand f o r  money), w h i l e  government bonds and c o r p o r a t e  bonds and s t o c k s  
a r e  poor s u b s t i t u t e s  ( t h e r e b y  c a u s i n g  t h e  w e a l t h  e f f e c t  t o  r a i s e  t h e  demand 
f o r  c o r p o r a t e  bonds) . ( c o n t i n u e d )  
1983 t h e  government d e b t  h e l d  by t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  r o s e  a t  an average  annua l  
r a t e  o f  1 3 . 3  p e r c e n t ,  whereas Y 1  and i'12 grew a t  r a t e s  o f  7 .4  p e r c e n t  and 9 . 2  
p e r c e n t  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  The d i E f e r e n c e s  i n  t h e s e  growth r a t e s  i n  t h e  s u p p l i e s  
o f  f i n a n c i a l  a s s e t s  d i v e r g e d  s h a r p l y  d u r i n g  t h e  l a t t e r  p a r t  o f  t h i s  p e r i o d .  
Between 1981 and 1983 t h e  growth o f  d e b t  a c c e l e r a t e d  t o  an annual  r a t e  o f  19.9  
p e r c e n t  w h i l e  t h e  monetary  growth r a t e s  were h e l d  t o  r a t e s  o f  8 . 4  and 9 .7  p e r c e n t  
f o r  and M2 r e s p e c t i v e l y .  
The budget  d e f i c i t  o f  $179.7 b i l l i o n  p r o j e c t e d  f o r  FY 1984 i n  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  
Mid-Session Review i s  l e s s  t h a n  t h e  d e f i c i t  o f  $195.4 b i l l i o n  e s t i m a t e d  f o r  FY 1983. 
N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  i t  i m p l i e s  growth o f  p r i v a t e l y  h e l d  government d e b t  of  1 3  p e r c e n t ,  
assuming t h a t  t h e  1983 r a t i o  o f  p r i v a t e  t o  g r o s s  F e d e r a l  d e b t  p e r s i s t s .  The 
monetary  growth t a r g e t s  f o r  1984 announced by t h e  F e d e r a l  Reserve  a r e  4 t o  8  pe r -  
c e n t  f o r  M I  and 6 . 5  t o  9 .5  p e r c e n t  f o r  M 2 .  Even a t  t h e  t o p  o f  t h e s e  r a n g e s ,  i t  
seems c l e a r  t h a t  r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e s  o f  f i n a n c i a l  a s s e t s  w i l l  c o n t i n u e  t o  change  
i n  a  manner l i k e l y  t o  p l a c e  upward p r e s s u r e  on i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  
The p o r t f o l i o  e f f e c t  d e s c r i b e d  above w i l l  t e n d  t o  r a i s e  i n t e r e s t s  r a t e s  and 
s low spend ing  on i n t e r e s t - s e n s i t i v e  e x p e n d i t u r e  components.  On t h e  o t h e r  hand,  
t h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  w e a l t h  caused  by d e f i c i t  f i n a n c i n g  w i l l  t e n d  t o  r a i s e  consumption.  
T h i s  spend ing  e f f e c t  w i l l  add t o  t h e  upward p r e s s u r e  on i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  However, 
i t s  e f f e c t  on spend ing  i s  e x p a n s i o n a r y .  
E .  Supply S i d e  Tax Cuts  and I n t e r e s t  R a t e s  
During t h e  d e b a t e  t h a t  preceded t h e  Economic Recovery Tax Act o f  1981 
p roponen t s  o f  s o  c a l l e d  "supply  s i d e "  t a x  c u t s  were s u g g e s t i n g  t h a t  income t a x  
( c o n t i n u e d )  U l t i m a t e l y ,  t h e  w e a l t h - i n t e r e s t  r e l a t i o n s h i p  depends  on t h e  e x t e n t  
t o  which t h e  demand f o r  money depends  on w e a l t h .  The e m p i r i c a l  e v i d e n c e ,  which 
i s  su rveyed  by Friedman, i s  mixed.  However, t h e  a u t h o r  r e g a r d s  i t  as s u f f i -  
c i e n t l y  r o b u s t  t o  c a u s e  genu ine  c o n c e r n  o v e r  " p o r t f o l i o  crowdout".  
Friedman ~ r o v i d e s  a  u s e f u l  d i s t i n c t i o n  between t r a n s a c t i o n s  crowd o u t  and 
p o r t f o l i o  crowd o u t .  T r a n s a c t i o n s  crowdout means t h a t  a  r i s e  i n  t h e  s t r u c t u r a l  
d e f i c i t  i n c r e a s e s  spend ing  and t h e  demand f o r  money. T h i s  r a i s e s  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  
and r e d u c e s  i n v e s t m e n t .  P o r t f o l i o  crowdout r e f e r s  t o  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  e f f e c t s  
caused  by t h e  d e f i c i t  as d i s c u s s e d  i n  t h i s  s e c t i o n  o f  t h e  t e x t .  
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r e d u c t i o n s  would p r o v i d e  i n c e n t i v e s  t o  " s a v e  and i n v e s t . "  The i m p l i c a t i o n  of 
t h e  argument was t h a t  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  would f a l l  s i n c e  t a x  c u t s  i n c r e a s e  t h e  
s u p p l y  of s a v i n g .  A c u t  i n  p e r s o n a l  t a x e s  i n c r e a s e s  t h e  d i s p o s a b l e  ( a f t e r - t a x )  
incomes of househo lds .  A f r a c t i o n  o f  t h i s  g a i n  i s  used t o  r a i s e  consumption 
w h i l e  t h e  remainder  i s  saved .  The h i g h e r  s a v i n g s  t h e n  c r e a t e  a  demand f o r  
s e c u r i t i e s  o r ,  which i s  t o  s a y  t h e  same t h i n g ,  i n c r e a s e  t h e  s u p p l y  of f i n a n c e  
a v a i l a b l e  f o r  i n v e s t m e n t .  The s u p p l y  s i d e r s  seemed t o  assume t h a t  t h i s  would 
i n c r e a s e  s e c u r i t y  p r i c e s ,  r e d u c e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s ,  and t h u s  p r o v i d e  more f a v o r a b l e  
t e r m s  f o r  t h e  borrowing needed t o  f i n a n c e  inves tment  p r o j e c t s .  
T h i s  argument a p p e a r s  t o  be based on t h e  n o t i o n  t h a t  i t  i s  o n l y  p r i v a t e  
s a v i n g  t h a t  e n t e r s  i n t o  t h e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  However, i n t e r e s t  
r a t e s  a r e  de te rmined  by t o t a l  n a t i o n a l  s a v i n g  r e l a t i v e  t o  i n v e s t m e n t .  The bud- 
g e t  d e f i c i t  i s  a major  n e g a t i v e  component of n a t i o n a l  s a v i n g .  Suppose t h a t  a  
t a x  r e d u c t i o n  o f  $1 r a i s e s  p r i v a t e  consumption by 7 5  c e n t s  and s a v i n g  by 25 c e n t s .  
T h i s  adds  25 c e n t s  t o  t h e  s u p p l y  of f i n a n c e .  But ,  s i n c e  t h e  budget  d e f i c i t  r i s e s  
by t h e  f u l l  $1 ,  t h e  demand f o r  f i n a n c i n g  i n c r e a s e s  by t h a t  amount. Consequent ly ,  
t o t a l  n a t i o n a l  s a v i n g  i s  reduced by 75 c e n t s .  The s u p p l y  o f  new s e c u r i t i e s  
t h e r e f o r e  i n c r e a s e s  by more t h a n  i t s  demand. The consequence i s  t h a t  s e c u r i t y  
p r i c e s  f a l l  and i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  r i s e .  
P o s s i b l y  t h e  a p p a r e n t  e r r o r  a r i s e s  from a  f a i l u r e  t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  between t h e  
e f f e c t s  of t a x  r e d u c t i o n  from t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  t a x  reform.  For example,  a  t a x  r e f o r m  
t h a t  exempts s a v i n g  from t a x a t i o n ,  w h i l e  y i e l d i n g  t h e  same revenue a s  b e f o r e ,  
might  r e s u l t  i n  a h i g h e r  l e v e l  o f  p r i v a t e  s a v i n g .  S i n c e  t h e  re fo rm i s  e f f e c t e d  
w i t h o u t  i n c r e a s i n g  t h e  d e f i c i t ,  t o t a l  n a t i o n a l  s a v i n g  i n c r e a s e s  and i n t e r e s t  
rates t h e r e f o r e  d e c l i n e .  
F. F i n a n c i a l  I n n o v a t i o n s  and I n t e r e s t  R a t e s  
It i s  o f t e n  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  h i g h  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  have s p u r r e d  many of t h e  
f i n a n c i a l  i n n o v a t i o n s  of r e c e n t  y e a r s .  A t  t h e  same t i m e  c e r t a i n  f i n a n c i a l  
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i n n o v a t i o n s  may have c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  h i g h e r  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  The most o b v i o u s  
of t h e  changes  t h a t  may have o p e r a t e d  i n  t h i s  manner i s  t h e  payment of 
i n t e r e s t  on check ing  a c c o u n t s .  S i n c e  check ing  a c c o u n t s  p r e v i o u s l y  p a i d  
no i n t e r e s t ,  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e y  now pay i n t e r e s t  f o r c e s  bor rowers  t o  pay h i g h e r  
r a t e s  f o r  funds .  A change from z e r o  t o  f i v e  p e r c e n t  i n t e r e s t  on t r a n s a c t i o n s  
a c c o u n t s  i n  some way r a i s e s  t h e  c o s t  b a s i s  on which a l l  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  a r e  
de te rmined .  
The h i g h e r  c o s t  o f  a c q u i r i n g  funds  r a i s e s  t h e  r a t e s  charged  f o r  bank 
l o a n s .  Thus,  s u c h  r a t e s  a s  t h e  prime l e n d i n g  r a t e  and t h e  commercial  paper  
r a t e  are l i k e l y  t o  remain permanen t ly  h i g h e r  a s  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  t h i s  f i n a n c i a l  
i n n o v a t i o n .  But what abou t  o t h e r  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s ?  The macroeconomic i n t e r p r e -  
t a t i o n  of t h e  e f f e c t  of t h e  NOW account  i s  t h a t  i t  h a s  r a i s e d  t h e  demand f o r  
money. With a  z e r o  r a t e  o f  i n t e r e s t  on d e p o s i t s ,  w e a l t h  h o l d e r s  have a  s t r o n g  
i n c e n t i v e  t o  ho ld  a s  few t r a n s a c t i o n s  b a l a n c e s  a s  p o s s i b l e .  Once i n t e r e s t  i s  
ea rned  on t r a n s a c t i o n s  a c c o u n t s ,  however, t h i s  p r e s s u r e  t o  economize d i m i n i s h e s  
s o  t h a t  t h e  demand f o r  money i n c r e a s e s  and i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  r i s e .  To p u t  i t  
d i f f e r e n t l y ,  t h e r e  i s  a s u b s t i t u t i o n  away from o t h e r  f i n a n c i a l  a s s e t s  i n t o  NOW 
a c c o u n t s  which h a s  a  d e p r e s s i n g  e f f e c t  on t h e  p r i c e s  of competing a s s e t s .  
Money market  f u n d s ,  which have grown r a p i d l y  i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s  and which a r e  
now i n c l u d e d  a s  p a r t  of M2, have p robab ly  had a  similar e f f e c t .  They r a i s e  t h e  
demand f o r  M2 r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  demand f o r  a l t e r n a t i v e  f i n a n c i a l  a s s e t s  and ,  
t h e r e f o r e ,  t e n d  t o  r a i s e  a l l  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  The e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y  s h a r p  1982 
r e d u c t i o n  i n  v e l o c i t y  i s  probab ly  p a r t l y  a t t r i b u t a b l e  t o  t h e  growth o f  NOW 
a c c o u n t s  and money market  mutual  funds .  
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Higher  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  a r e  t h e  consequence of t h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  demand 
f o r  money. The h i g h e r  r a t e s  a r e  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  permanent a s  i s  assumed by 
t h o s e  who speak o f  t h e s e  i n n o v a t i o n s  a s  c a u s i n g  an  upward r a t c h e t i n g .  An 
a l t e r n a t i v e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  t h e  i n f l u e n c e  of t h e s e  i n n o v a t i o n s  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  t h e  
e f f e c t s  on most i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  c a n  be  o f f s e t  by a  one-time monetary  accommodation 
t h a t  matches  t h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  l i q u i d i t y  p r e f e r e n c e .  T h i s  accouunodation s h o u l d ,  i n  
f a c t ,  r e d u c e  bank r a t e s  s i n c e  t h e r e  i s  no r e a s o n  t o  suppose t h a t  banks would c o n t i n u e  
t o  pay c u r r e n t  r a t e s  on NOW a c c o u n t s  i f  t h a t  i s  n o t  n e c e s s a r y  t o  o b t a i n  f u n d s .  
The r i s e  i n  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  caused by t h e  r i s e  i n  l i q u i d i t y  p r e f e r e n c e  i s  n o t ,  
t h e r e f o r e ,  s e e n  a s  n e c e s s a r i l y  permanent a l t h o u g h  t h o s e  r a t e s  t h a t  a r e  t h e  
most c l o s e l y  r e l a t e d  t o  bank l e n d i n g  a r e  a p t  t o  remain permanent ly  h i g h e r  t h a n  
p r i o r  t o  t h e  i n n o v a t i o n s .  
G .  E x p e c t a t i o n s  and I n t e r e s t  R a t e s  
Another  s e t  o f  arguments  i d e n t i f i e s  e x p e c t a t i o n s  a s  a  c o n t r i b u t i n g  c a u s e  
o f  h i g h  c u r r e n t  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  Two such  arguments a r e  prominent .  The f i r s t  i s  
t h a t  i n f l a t i o n a r y  e x p e c t a t i o n s  c o n t i n u e  t o  b e  h i g h .  T h i s  t e n d s  t o  r a i s e  nominal 
i n t e r e s t  r a t e s ,  a s  e x p l a i n e d  below. The second i s  t h a t  t h e  p e r s i s t e n c e  o f  l a r g e  
budge t  d e f i c i t s  e n s u r e s  h i g h  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  i n  t h e  f u t u r e ,  and t h e  m a r k e t ' s  
r e s p o n s e  t o  t h i s  i s  t o  r a i s e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  i n  t h e  p r e s e n t .  
A s  n o t e d  a t  t h e  beg inn ing  of t h i s  p a p e r ,  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  i n f l a t i o n  r a t e s  
cannot  e x p l a i n  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  between c u r r e n t  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  and r a t e s  e x p e r i -  
enced a t  comparable  s t a g e s  o f  p a s t  b u s i n e s s  c y c l e s .  However, i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  
t h a t  t h e  expec ted  r a t e  of i n f l a t i o n  may be h i g h e r  today  t h a n  i t  was i n  1975-76.  
Some would c l a i m  t h a t  r e c e n t  e x p e r i e n c e  w i t h  consumer p r i c e s  r i s i n g  i n  e x c e s s  
of 10 p e r c e n t  a y e a r  h a s  c r e a t e d  a n  environment  o f  g e n e r a l l y  g r e a t e r  i n f l a t i o n a r y  
e x p e c t a t i o n s ,  w h i l e  o t h e r s  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  p e r s i s t e n c e  of a  budget d e f i c i t  pro- 
v i d e s  a  b a s i s  f o r  f o r e c a s t i n g  a  r e a c c e l e r a t i o n  of i n f l a t i o n .  I f  s o ,  t h e  e x p e c t e d  
r a t e  o f  i n f l a t i o n  c o u l d  a c c o u n t ,  i n  p a r t ,  f o r  h i g h e r  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  
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I n  d i s c u s s i n g  t h e  e f f e c t s  of i n f l a t i o n a r y  e x p e c t a t i o n s ,  nominal r a t e s  
o f  i n t e r e s t  shou ld  be d i s t i n g u i s h e d  from r e a l  r a t e s  of i n t e r e s t .  The 
r e a l  r a t e  of i n t e r e s t  e q u a l s  t h e  nominal r a t e  of i n t e r e s t  minus t h e  expec ted  
r a t e  of i n f l a t i o n .  I f  t h e  expec ted  r a t e  o f  i n f l a t i o n  i s  5 p e r c e n t ,  a  l o a n  made 
a t  5 p e r c e n t  m e r e l y  r e t a i n s  i t s  p u r c h a s i n g  power w i t h o u t  e a r n i n g  any r e a l  r e t u r n  
t o  t h e  l e n d e r .  Thus,  t h e  nominal r a t e  o f  i n t e r e s t  must exceed t h e  e x p e c t e d  r a t e  
o f  i n f l a t i o n  t o  p r o v i d e  a n  expec ted  r e t u r n  i n  e x c e s s  o f  t h e  amount needed t o  
keep  purchas ing  power i n t a c t .  
A r i s e  i n  t h e  expec ted  r a t e  of i n f l a t i o n  i n c r e a s e s  t h e  s p r e a d  between r e a l  
and nominal r a t e s  o f  i n t e r e s t .  I f  t h e  r e a l  r a t e  o f  i n t e r e s t  r emains  unchanged, 
t h i s  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  sp read  i m p l i e s  a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  nominal i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  It 
i s  f o r  t h i s  r e a s o n  t h a t  e x p a n s i o n a r y  monetary  p o l i c y  i s  sometimes regarded  by 
f i n a n c i a l  w r i t e r s  a s  a  c a u s e  o f  r i s i n g ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  f a l l i n g ,  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  
The argument i s  t h a t  a  r i s e  i n  t h e  r a t e  o f  nominal money growth r a i s e s  t h e  
e x p e c t e d  r a t e  of i n f l a t i o n .  I t ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  widens t h e  s p r e a d  between r e a l  and 
nominal r a t e s  and r a i s e s  t h e  nominal r a t e .  9 /  - 
The argument seems i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  fundamental  economic l o g i c  inasmuch a s  
i t  i m p l i e s  t h a t  t h e  p r i c e  of a  commodity i n c r e a s e s  when i t s  s u p p l y  i n c r e a s e s  
r e l a t i v e  t o  demand. But i t  i s  n o t  q u i t e  so  i l l o g i c a l  when t h e  r e a l  r a t h e r  t h a n  
t h e  nominal p r i c e  i s  c o n s i d e r e d .  A r i s e  i n  t h e  expec ted  r a t e  o f  i n f l a t i o n  s h o u l d  
have t h e  e f f e c t  o f  r e d u c i n g  l i q u i d i t y  p r e f e r e n c e  because  t h e  h o l d i n g  of c a s h  
b a l a n c e s  becomes l e s s  a t t r a c t i v e  a s  t h e  expec ted  r a t e  o f  i n f l a t i o n  r i s e s .  Wealth 
h o l d e r s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  become w i l l i n g  t o  a c c e p t  a  lower  r e a l  r a t e  of r e t u r n  on a s s e t s  
t h a n  b e f o r e .  They respond by c o n v e r t i n g  c a s h  i n t o  o t h e r  a s s e t s ,  b i d d i n g  up t h e  
9 /  An a l t e r n a t i v e  e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  t h i s  phenomenon i s  p r e s e n t e d  i n  
S e c t i o n  1 1 1 - B .  
r e a l  p r i c e s  of t h e s e  a s s e t s  and lower ing  t h e i r  r e a l  y i e l d s .  T h e r e f o r e ,  w h i l e  
a  r i s e  i n  t h e  expec ted  r a t e  of i n f l a t i o n  may r a i s e  nominal i n t e r e s t  r a t e s ,  
t h e  r i s e . w i l 1  be  l e s s  t h a n  t h e  r i s e  i n  t h e  expec ted  r a t e  o f  i n f l a t i o n ,  and r e a l  
r a t e s  o f  i n t e r e s t  shou ld  f a l l .  T h i s ,  t h e n ,  r e - e s t a b l i s h e s  f a i t h  i n  t h e  p r o p o s i t i o n  
t h a t  a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  s u p p l y  o f  a  commodity ( i n  t h i s  c a s e  money) w i l l  lower  
i t s  p r i c e .  101 -
These c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  s u g g e s t  t h a t  a  h i g h  expec ted  r a t e  of i n f l a t i o n  i s  
expans ionary .  Inves tment  d e c i s i o n s ,  f o r  example,  a r e  based on t h e  r e a l  c o s t  of 
borrowing.  A r i s e  i n  t h e  expec ted  r a t e  o f  i n f l a t i o n  r e d u c e s  t h i s  r e a l  c o s t ,  
d e s p i t e  a  r i s e  i n  i t s  nominal c o s t .  It i s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  i m p o r t a n t  t o  n o t e  t h a t  
t h i s  s o u r c e  of h i g h  nominal i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  cannot  be used a s  a n  argument t h a t  
h i g h  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  undermine t h e  growth o f  demand and t h r e a t e n  r e c o v e r y .  
A c r i t i c a l  d i f f i c u l t y  w i t h  t h e  i n f l a t i o n a r y  e x p e c t a t i o n s  argument i s  t h a t  
i t  cannot  e x p l a i n  h i g h  s h o r t - t e r m  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  The expec ted  r a t e  of i n f l a -  
t i o n  c a n  h a r d l y  d i f f e r  from t h e  a c t u a l  i n f l a t i o n  r a t e  o v e r  a  s h o r t  p e r i o d  such  
a s  3 months. Consequent ly ,  t h e  i n f l a t i o n a r y  e x p e c t a t i o n s  argument cannot  e x p l a i n  
why .shor t - t e rm i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  i n  t h e  1976 r e c e s s i o n  t r o u g h  were 2 p e r c e n t a g e  p o i n t s  
101  T h i s  w i d e l y  a c c e p t e d  argument i s  a t t r i b u t a b l e  t o  Tobin ,  James. Honey 
and ~ Z n o m i c  Growth. Econornetrica,  October  1965, p. 671-84. An a d d i t i o n a l  argument 
i s  s u p p l i e d  by Mundel l ,  Rober t  A. I n f l a t i o n  and Rea l  I n t e r e s t  R a t e s .  J o u r n a l  of 
P o l i t i c a l  Economy, J u n e  1963. p. 280-83. Mundell r easoned  t h a t  a  r i s e  i n  t h e  r a t e  
of i n f l a t i o n  r e d u c e s  t h e  v a l u e  of t h e  n e t  c l a i m s  o f  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  a g a i n s t  t h e  
government.  These n e t  c l a i m s ,  o r  r e a l  b a l a n c e s  a s  t h e y  a r e  c a l l e d ,  c o n s i s t  of t h e  
monetary  base  p l u s  government bonds.  A s  a  r e s u l t  of t h e  e r o s i o n  due t o  i n f l a t i o n ,  
w e a l t h  h o l d e r s  s u f f e r  a  d e c l i n e  i n  t h e  r e a l  v a l u e  o f  t h e i r  w e a l t h .  Inasmuch a s  
s a v i n g s  have been shown t o  respond i n v e r s e l y  t o  changes  i n  w e a l t h ,  t h i s  t h e n  
l e a d s  t o  a  r i s e  i n  t h e  f r a c t i o n  of income saved by househo lds .  The i n c r e a s e d  
s a v i n g s  add t o  t h e  s u p p l y  o f  f i n a n c e  and d e p r e s s  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  Unl ike  T o b i n ' s  
l i q u i d i t y  p r e f e r e n c e  argument,  t h e  Mundell argument i m p l i e s  t h a t  a  r i s e  i n  t h e  
e x p e c t e d  r a t e  o f  i n f l a t i o n  i s  r e s t r i c t i v e  because  t h e  f r a c t i o n  of income consumed 
d e c l i n e s .  Most economis t s  c o n s i d e r  t h e  Tobin e f f e c t  t o  be t h e  more powerful  and 
a  r i s e  i n  t h e  expec ted  r a t e  of i n f l a t i o n  i s  t h e r e f o r e  regarded  a s  e x p a n s i o n a r y .  
These c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  s u g g e s t  t h a t  t h e  r i s e  i n  nominal i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  w i l l  
t e n d  t o  be  l e s s  t h a n  t h e  r i s e  i n  t h e  expec ted  r a t e  of i n f l a t i o n  because  t h e  r e a l  
r a t e  o f  i n t e r e s t  d e c l i n e s .  However, even w i t h  a  d e c l i n e  i n  t h e  r e a l  r a t e  of i n -  
t e r e s t ,  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  f o r  nominal i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  t o  r i s e  by more t h a n  t h e  r i s e  ' ( c o n t i n u e  
lower  t h a n  i n  1982, p e r i o d s  when a c t u a l  i n f l a t i o n  r a t e s  were r o u g h l y  comparable .  
The argument i s ,  however, h e l p f u l  i n  e x p l a i n i n g  t h e  i n c r e a s i n g  s p r e a d  between 
s h o r t  and long- term i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  
The second e x p e c t a t i o n a l  argument i s  t h a t  p e r s i s t e n t l y  l a r g e  budget d e f i c i t s ,  
i n  combinat ion w i t h  c o n t i n u e d  s t r e n g t h e n i n g  of t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  of t h e  economy, 
w i l l  d r i v e  up i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  i n  t h e  f u t u r e .  T h i s  e x p e c t a t i o n  of h i g h e r  f u t u r e  
r a t e s  o f  i n t e r e s t  t h e n  h o l d s  c u r r e n t  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  a t  e l e v a t e d  l e v e l s .  T h i s  i s  
a  w i d e l y  h e l d  view. The Counci l  of Economic A d v i s e r s ,  f o r  example,  s t a t e s  i t  a s  
f o l l o w s  : 
The p r o s p e c t  o f  l a r g e  budget  d e f i c i t s  i n  t h e  second h a l f  o f  t h i s  
d e c a d e  may a l s o  have a n  a d v e r s e  e f f e c t  on t h e  p r o s p e c t s  for  r e c o v e r y  
i n  1983. I f  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  m a r k e t s  respond t o  expec ted  f u t u r e  d e f i c i t s  
by keep ing  r e a l  long-term i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  h i g h e r  i n  1983 t h a n  t h e y  would 
o t h e r w i s e  b e ,  t h e  l e v e l  o f  spending i n  1983 on i n t e r e s t - s e n s i t i v e  
p u r c h a s e s  may remain d e p r e s s e d .  - 111 
111 Economic Repor t  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t ,  February  1983,  p. 28 .  -
( c o n t i n u e d  from p r e v i o u s  page)  t h e  expec ted  r a t e  of i n f l a t i o n  once t a x e s  a r e  
t a k e n  i n t o  account .  A f t e r  one y e a r ,  t h e  nominal v a l u e  o f  one d o l l a r  l e n t  a t  a  
nominal  r a t e  of i n t e r e s t ,  i ,  and s u b j e c t  t o  a  p r o p o r t i o n a l  t a x  a t  a  r a t e  of t 
p e r c e n t  i s  1 + i ( 1 - t ) .  T h i s  must e q u a l  t h e  r e a l  v a l u e  of t h e  a s s e t  a f t e r  
a l l o w a n c e  f o r  expec ted  i n f l a t i o n .  Accord ing ly ,  
where r i s  t h e  r e a l  a f t e r  t a x  r a t e  o f  i n t e r e s t  and x  i s  t h e  expec ted  r a t e  of 
i n f l a t i o n .  The s o l u t i o n  f o r  t h e  nominal r a t e  o f  i n t e r e s t  i s ,  
I f  t h e  r e a l  r a t e  o f  i n t e r e s t  i s  h e l d  c o n s t a n t ,  t h e  r i s e  i n  t h e  nominal r a t e  of 
i n t e r e s t  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  expec ted  r a t e  o f  i n f l a t i o n  i s ,  
S i n c e  t h i s  exceeds  u n i t y ,  i t  i m p l i e s  t h a t  a  r i s e  i n  t h e  i n f l a t i o n  r a t e  i n c r e a s e s  
t h e  s p r e a d  between r e a l  and nominal r a t e s  o f  i n t e r e s t  by a f a c t o r  g r e a t e r  t h a n  1. 
On t h i s  p o i n t  s e e  Peek,  J o e .  I n t e r e s t  R a t e s ,  Income Taxes ,  and A n t i c i p a t e d  
I n f l a t i o n .  American Economic Review, December 1982. p  980-991. 
CRS-32 
Many i n v e s t o r s  e x p e c t  a r i s e  i n  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  i n  t h e  n e a r  f u t u r e .  
Congress  may t a k e  no major f i s c a l  p o l i c y  a c t i o n  d u r i n g  t h e  e l e c t i o n  y e a r .  i f  
n o t ,  f i s c a l  p o l i c y  w i l l  r emain  e x p a n s i o n a r y .  As t h e  economy c o n t i n u e s  t o  r e c o v e r  
t h e  demand f o r  money w i l l  i n c r e a s e  and t h e  s u p p l y  o f  government s e c u r i t i e s  n e e d i n g  
t o  be  f i n a n c e d  w i l l  a l s o  i n c r e a s e .  T h i s  means t h e r e  w i l l  b e  s t r o n g  f o r c e s  from 
t h e  f i s c a l  s i d e  making f o r  h i g h e r  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  Whether r a t e s  w i l l ,  i n  f a c t ,  
r i s e  depends  on how t h e  F e d e r a l  Rese rve  r e s p o n d s .  I n t e r e s t  r a t e s  w i l l  remain  
s t a b l e  i f  t h e  r a p i d  r e a l  r a t e s  of  rconetary growth of t h e  f i r s t  h a l f  of  1983 a r e  
resumed i n  1984. I f  t h i s  g i v e s  r i s e  t o  a  r e v i v a l  o f  i n f l a t i o n  and i n f l a t i o n a r y  
e x p e c t a t i o n s ,  nominal  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  w i l l  r i s e ,  a l t h o u g h  r e a l  r a t e s  may f a l l .  
However, i f  t h e  F e d e r a l  Rese rve  responds  t o  t h e  emergence o f  i n f l a t i o n a r y  p r e s s u r e  
by s lowing  r a t e s  of monetary  growth,  t h e n  s u r e l y  b o t h  r e a l  and nominal  i n t e r e s t  
r a t e s  w i l l  r i s e .  
A p o p u l a r  e x p e c t a t i o n  i s  t h a t  t h e  F e d e r a l  Reserve  w i l l  succumb t o  e l e c t i o n  
y e a r  p r e s s u r e  by  r a i s i n g  t h e  r a t e  o f  monetary  growth i n  t h e  months p r i o r  t o  e l e c -  
t i o n .  I n  t h a t  " p o l i t i c a l  b u s i n e s s  c y c l e "  s c e n a r i o ,  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  w i l l  come down 
somewhat i n  1984. I f  t h a t  happened ,  a  d e c l i n e  i n  r a t e s  would r e q u i r e  a  h i g h l y  expan- 
s i o n a r y  monetary  p o l i c y ,  l e a d i n g  most l i k e l y  t o  an  o v e r h e a t i n g  of t h e  econony and a  
r e v i v a l  of  i n f l a t i o n .  I n t e r e s t  r a t e s  would t h e n  r i s e  i n  l a t e  1984 and 1985 a s  t h e  
F e d e r a l  Reserve  a g a i n  t i g h t e n e d  i t s  monetary  g r i p  and a s  r i s i n g  i n f l a t i o n a r y  
e x p e c t a t i o n s  d r o v e  up nominal  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  
The b e h a v i o r  of t h e  F e d e r a l  Reserve  t o  t h e  p r e s e n t  does  n o t  s u p p o r t  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  
b u s i n e s s  c y c l e  h y p o t h e s i s ,  k e e p i n g  i n  mind t h a t  t h e  19b4 campaign s t i l l  h a s  s e v e r a l  
months t o  r u n .  Although monetary  growth r a t e s  were e x t r e m e l y  h i g h  th rough  t h e  
f i r s t  h a l f  of 1983,  w i t h  M2 growing a t  a n  annua l  r a t e  of 16.4  p e r c e n t ,  t h e r e  
h a s  been a  s h a r p  t a i l i n g  o f f  s i n c e  t h a t  t i m e  t o  a r a t e  of  6 . 8  p e r c e n t  from June 
t o  December. 
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A l l  i n  a l l ,  i t  i s  reasonable  t o  expect  t h a t  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  w i l l  r i s e  i f  
t h e  economic recovery cont inues  . The c u r r e n t  f i s c  al-monet ary mix makes t h i s  
outcome l i k e l y .  How, then,  does t h i s  a f f e c t  c u r r e n t  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s ?  The 
expec ta t ion  of a  r i s e  i n  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  c a r r i e s  with i t  the  expec ta t ion  of 
c a p i t a l  l o s s e s  on long-term ins t ruments  because bond p r i c e s  vary i n v e r s e l y  
with r e s p e c t  t o  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  Therefore ,  t he  i n v e s t o r  who expec ts  i n t e r e s t  
r a t e s  t o  r i s e  w i l l  tend t o  move out  of long term bonds i n t o  o t h e r  a s s e t s  
inc luding  money. Such an i n c r e a s e  i n  l i q u i d i t y  p re fe rence  impl ies  t h a t  long term 
i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  w i l l  be h ighe r  a t  p resent  because of t he  expect a t i on  of h ighe r  
f u t u r e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  Borrowers, too ,  may respond i n  a way t h a t  r a i s e s  long- 
term i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  I f  they b e l i e v e  the  c o s t  of long-term commitments w i l l  
r i s e ,  they  may a c c e l e r a t e  t h e i r  spending p l ans ,  borrowing now while  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  
a r e  lower than those  expected i n  t h e  f u t u r e .  Th i s ,  too,  tends t o  r a i s e  c u r r e n t  
i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  by inc reas ing  the  demand f o r  money. Rather than r e t a r d  recovery ,  
t h i s  source  of h ighe r  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  adds s t imulus  i n  t he  form of h ighe r  p re sen t  
spending t o  t he  economy. 
\The d e c l i n i n g  a t t r a c t i v e n e s s  of  long-term lending i n  t h e  face  of an expected 
r i s e  i n  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  should be r e f l e c t e d  i n  an i n c r e a s e  i n  short- term lending .  
S i m i l a r l y ,  e r s t w h i l e  short- term borrowers may move towards longer-term commitinents 
i n  o rde r  t o  avoid the  r i s i n g  i n t e r e s t  c o s t s  expected i n  t he  f u t u r e .  For t h e s e  
reasons ,  t h e  expec ta t ion  of a r i s e  i n  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  i s  l i k e l y  t o  have i t s  p r in-  
c i p a l  e f f e c t  i n  widening the  spread between shor t - te rm and long-term i n t e r e s t  
r a t e s .  Long-term r a t e s  may be  h ighe r  because of h ighe r  expected i n t e r e s t  r a t e s ,  
but  short- term r a t e s  should be lower. 
H .  High I n t e r e s t  Rates as a  Consequence of Var iab le  Rates 
In  October 1979  t he  Federa l  Reserve changed i t s  ope ra t ing  procedures away 
from a  po l i cy  t h a t  i t  s a i d  was designed t o  prevent  major f l u c t u a t i o n s  i n  i n t e r e s t  
r a t e s  towards a  "monetar is t"  pos ture  t h a t  ignores  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  and seeks ,  
i n s t e a d ,  t o  m a i n t a i n  s t e a d y  growth o f  monetary  a g g r e g a t e s  w i t h i n  s e t s  o f  p re -  
v i o u s l y  announced t a r g e t  r a n g e s .  S p e c i f i c  a l l y ,  t a r g e t s  f o r  t h e  Feder  a1 funds  
r a t e  were abandoned and r e p l a c e d  by t a r g e t  l e v e l s  o f  .non-borrowed r e s e r v e s .  
The v a r i a b i l i t y  o f  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  h a s  i n c r e a s e d  s i n c e  t h e  p o l i c y  s w i t c h .  
I f  t h e  demand f o r  money and c r e d i t  i n c r e a s e  a t  a  more r a p i d  r a t e  t h a n  t h e  monetary  
growth t a r g e t ,  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  w i l l  r i s e .  I f  t h e  demand f o r  money and c r e d i t  
d e c l i n e s ,  w h i l e  monetary  growth r a t e s  a r e  main t  a ined a t  p r e v i o u s l y  announced 
r a t e s ,  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  w i l l  f a l l .  141  -
A measure  o f  such  v a r i a b i l i t y  i s  t h e  s t a n d a r d  d e v i a t i o n  o f  t h e  r e t u r n  on 
d i f f e r e n t  a s s e t  c a t e g o r i e s .  Such c a l c u l a t i o n s  have  been made by Bodie ,  Kane, 
and XcDonald - 151 f o r  t h e  p e r i o d  J a n u a r y  1977-September 1979 and compared w i t h  
t h e  p e r i o d  J a n u a r y  1980-December 1981.  The r e s u l t s  show a  s t a r t l i n g  i n c r e a s e  i n  
v a r i a b i l i t y .  Long-term bonds a r e  t h e  most s e v e r e l y  a f f e c t e d ,  showing an i n c r e a s e  
i n  t h e  s t a n d a r d  d e v i a t i o n  o f  r e t u r n  o f  from 5 .4  p e r c e n t  on 8 y e a r  bonds i n  t h e  
e a r l i e r  p e r i o d  t o  20.4  p e r c e n t  i n  t h e  l a t e r  p e r i o d .  
These same a u t h o r s  a rgue  t h a t  t h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  v a r i a b i l i t y  o f  r e t u r n  
i n c r e a s e s  t h e  r i s k  premiums t h a t  n u s t  be  added t o  r e a l  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  t o  induce  
l e n d e r s  t o  i n v e s t  i n  longer - t e rm i n s t r u m e n t s .  They, t h e r e f o r e ,  f i n d  t h e  exp lana-  
t i o n  f o r  h i g h e r  long- term i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  t o  l i e  i n  t h e  i n c r e a s e d  v a r i a b i l i t y  o f  
141 F a i r ,  Ray C .  E s t i m a t e d  E f f e c t s  o f  t h e  Oc tober  1979 Changes i n  Monetary 
p o l i c y  on t h e  1980 Economy. American Economic Review, May 1981, p.  160-165. F a i r  
e s t i m a t e s  t h a t  t h e  3-month T r e a s u r y  b i l l  r a t e  was h i g h e r  i n  t h e  f o u r t h  q u a r t e r  
o f  1979 and f i r s t  q u a r t e r  o f  1980 (by  1 . 5 8  and 1 .59 p e r c e n t a g e  p o i n t s ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y )  
and lower by 2 .22 p e r c e n t a g e  p o i n t s  i n  t h e  second q u a r t e r  of  1980,  t h a n  i t  would 
have been had t h e  F e d e r a l  Reserve  c o n t i n u e d  i t s  p r e v i o u s  p o l i c i e s .  These e a r l i e r  
p o l i c i e s  a r e  d e s c r i b e d  by F a i r  as " l e a n i n g  a g a i n s t  t h e  wind."  T h i s  means t h e  
F e d e r a l  Rese rve  p e r m i t t e d  s h o r t - t e r m  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  t o  r i s e  by a  l i m i t e d  p re -  
de te rmined  amount i n  r e s p o n s e  t o  an i n c r e a s e  i n  r e a l  economic a c t i v i t y ,  i n  t h e  
r a t e  o f  i n f l a t i o n ,  and i n  t h e  p a s t  growth o f  t h e  money s u p p l y .  These f a c t o r s  
a r e  i g n o r e d  under  t h e  new p o l i c y  which t a r g e t s  monetary  a g g r e g a t e s  a lone  and 
p e r m i t s  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  t o  f i n d  t h e i r  own l e v e l .  
151 Bodie ,  Z . ,  A.  Kane, and R .  McDonald. Why Are Real  I n t e r e s t  R a t e s  So 
~ i ~ h ? - ~ a t  i o n a l  Bureau o f  Economic Resea rch ,  Working Papzr  No. 1141. 
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i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  caused by t h e  s h i f t  i n  F e d e r a l  Reserve p o l i c y .  The argument i s  
t h a t  f l u c t u a t i n g  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  make f o r  h i g h e r  r e a l  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  because  o f  
i n c r e a s e s  i n  r i s k  premiums. 
The c a l c u l a t i o n  of r i s k  premiums v a r i e s  w i t h  assumpt ions  abou t  t h e  r e l a t i v e  
d e g r e e  of r i s k  a v e r s i o n  on t h e  p a r t  of i n v e s t o r s .  Wi th in  t h e  range  assumed t o  
be  r e a s o n a b l e  by t h e  a u t h o r s ,  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  r i s k  premium on 8 y e a r  bonds a r e  
a t  l e a s t  1.1 p e r c e n t a g e  p o i n t s  f o r  low r i s k  a v e r s i o n ,  and c o u l d  be a s  h i g h  a s  
6 . 4  p e r c e n t  i f  t h e  r i s k  a v e r s i o n  were g r e a t .  Thus, h i g h e r  v a r i a b i l i t y  o f  r e t u r n ,  
i m p l i e d  by f l u c t u a t i n g  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s ,  h e l p s  t o  e x p l a i n  t h e  c o n t i n u a t i o n  o f  h i g h  
y i e l d s  on long-term bonds a s  w e l l  a s  on e q u i t i e s  and o t h e r  s e c u r i t i e s  whose p r i c e s  
a r e  s e n s i t i v e  t o  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  Bu t ,  a s  n o t e d  by t h e s e  a u t h o r s ,  h i g h e r  s h o r t -  
t e rm i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  cannot  be e x p l a i n e d  i n  t h i s  manner. 

1 V .  lNTEKEST RATE POLICY 
A.  I n t e r e s t  Rate  T a r g e t i n g  
I f  f l u c t u a t i n g  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  a r e  a  c a u s e  of  h i g h  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  and 
i n c r e a s e d  u n c e r t a i n t y ,  i t  i s  i m p o r t a n t  t o  a s k  whe the r  t h e  F e d e r a l  Rese rve  shou ld  
r e t u r n  t o  a  p o l i c y  s t a n c e  t h a t  r e d u c e s  t h e  v a r i a b i l i t y  of  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  
Indeed ,  c o n c e r n  o v e r  h i g h  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  h a s  l e d  t o  demands f o r  t h e  F e d e r a l  
Reserve  t o  a l l e v i a t e  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  by t a r g e t i n g  i t s  monetary  p o l i c i e s  t o  a c h i e v e  
lower i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  S p e c u l a t i o n  i n  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  p r e s s  i n  December 1983 sug- 
g e s t e d  t h a t  t h e  F e d e r a l  Rese rve  h a d ,  i n  f a c t ,  once a g a i n  changed i t s  p o l i c y  
i n  a  way t h a t  d i r e c t e d  monetary p o l i c y  t o  t h e  a t t a i n m e n t  o f  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  t a r g e t s  
r a t h e r  t h a n  t h e  monetary  growth t a r g e t s  p r e s c r i b e d  i n  l e g i s l a t i o n .  
C r i t i c s  of  F e d e r a l  Rese rve  p o l i c y  h a v e  long  c la imed  t h a t  i t  i s  t h e  r e s p o n s i -  
b i l i t y  of  monetary  p o l i c y  t o  t a r g e t  o v e r a l l  n a t i o n a l  g o a l s  such a s  h i g h  employ- 
ment,  r a p i d  g rowth ,  and p r i c e  s t a b i l i t y .  Such c r i t i c s  c o n t e n d  t h a t  t h e  F e d e r a l  
Reserve  h a s  r e s i s t e d  p r e s s u r e  t o  show how i t s  p o l i c i e s  a r e  d e s i g n e d  t o  a c h i e v e  
t h e s e  g o a l s ,  p r e f e r r i n g ,  r a t h e r ,  t o  f o c u s  on p rox imate  t a r g e t s  more r e a d i l y  w i t h i n  
i t s  c o n t r o l .  Such p rox imate  t a r g e t s  a r e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  and t h e  r a t e s  o f  growth 
of t h e  monetary  a g g r e g a t e s .  I n d e e d ,  t h e  F e d e r a l  Rese rve  Keform Act of 1977 now 
o b l i g e s  t h e  F e d e r a l  Reserve  t o  e s t a b l i s h  t a r g e t  r a n g e s  f o r  t h e s e  a g g r e g a t e s .  
T a r g e t i n g  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  may be  a p p r o p r i a t e  when t h e  a t t a i n m e n t  o f  a n  i n t e r e s t  
r a t e  t a r g e t  i s  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  o t h e r  major  o b j e c t i v e s .  During a r e c e s s i o n ,  when 
unemployment i s  h i g h e r  t h a n  d e s i r a b l e ,  a  c o n s i s t e n t  monetary  p o l i c y  would b e  one 
t h a t  a t t e m p t s  t o  b r i n g  down i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  I f  i n f l a t i o n  i s  t h e  p r imary  problem, 
a  r e s t r i c t i v e  monetary  p o l i c y  t h a t  b r i n g s  about  h i g h e r  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  n a y  w e l l  be  
a p p r o p r i a t e .  I f  i t  i s  d e s i r a b l e  t o  a c c e l e r a t e  economic growth,  e x p a n s i o n a r y  monetary  
p o l i c y  i s  a p p r o p r i a t e .  But i f  t h e  economy i s  c l o s e  t o  f u l l  employment, such  monetary  
expans ion  shou ld  be  accompanied by more r e s t r i c t i v e  f i s c a l  p o l i c y ,  t o  o f f s e t  t h e  
i n f l a t i o n a r y  e f f e c t s  o f  t h e  monetary  p o l i c y .  
One c i r c u m s t a n c e  i n  which i t  i s  a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  t a r g e t  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  i s  
when t h e  s o u r c e  o f  an u n d e s i r a b l e  movement i n  t h e  economy i s  monetary  i n  o r i g i n .  
An i n c r e a s e  i n  l i q u i d i t y  p r e f e r e n c e  due  perhaps  t o  a  f i n a n c i a l  i n n o v a t i o n  t e n d s  
t o  r a i s e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  and lower  income growth.  I f  e x p a n s i o n a r y  monetary  p o l i c y  
p r e v e n t s  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  from r i s i n g ,  t h i s  a l s o  p r e v e n t s  t h e  d e c l i n e  i n  income. 
Thus,  i n  t h e  e v e n t  o f  a  monetary  shock ,  a  p o l i c y  t h a t  t a r g e t s ,  o r  pegs ,  i n t e r e s t  
r a t e s  h e l p s  p r o v i d e  o v e r a l l  s t a b i l i t y  t o  t h e  economy. T h i s  outcome f o l l o w s  from 
t h e  g e n e r a l  r u l e  t h a t  normal ly  i t  i s  b e s t  t o  d e a l  w i t h  a  shock a t  t h e  s o u r c e ;  a  
monetary  shock,  i n  t h i s  c a s e ,  b e i n g  o f f s e t  by a  monetary  r e s p o n s e .  
U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  t h e  r e c o r d  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  i n  many c a s e s  t h e  shocks  t h a t  c a u s e  
n a t i o n a l  income t o  change a r e  s o - c a l l e d  r e a l  shocks .  A r e a l  demand shock might  
b e  a  d e c l i n e  i n  consumer demand due t o  d e t e r i o r a t i n g  consumer s e n t i m e n t ,  a  
d e c l i n e  i n  c a p i t  a1 spend ing  due t o  a  l u l l  i n  i n v e n t i v e  a c t i v i t y ,  a d e c l i n e  i n  
e x p o r t s  due t o  d e t e r i o r a t i n g  f o r e i g n  economic c o n d i t i o n s ,  o r  a  f i s c a l  p o l i c y  
t h a t  e i t h e r  d i r e c t l y  a f f e c t s  t o t  a1 spend ing  through a  chaiige i n  government pur- 
c h a s e s  o r  i n d i r e c t l y  th rough  a  change i n  consumption caused  by a  tax change o r  a  
change i n  government t r a n s f e r  e x p e n d i t u r e s .  A l l  such r e a l  demand shocks  have 
t h e  c o m o n  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  t h a t  t h e y  t e n d  t o  nove n a t i o n a l  income and i n t e r e s t  
r a t e s  i n  t h e  same d i r e c t i o n .  For  example,  a  d e c l i n e  i n  inves tment  spend ing  lowers  
n a t i o n a l  income. S i n c e  t h i s  r e d u c e s  t h e  demand f o r  money, i t  a l s o  lowers  i n t e r e s t  
r a t e s .  I f  t h e  F e d e r a l  Rese rve  a t t e m p t s  t o  p r e v e n t  t h e  d e c l i n e  i n  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s ,  
i t  must pursue  a r e s t r i c t i v e  monetary  p o l i c y .  However, such a  p o l i c y  f u r t h e r  
lowers  n a t i o n a l  income and e x a c e r b a t e s  t h e  c o n t r a c t i o n  i n  t h e  economy. Thus an 
i n t e r e s t - r a t e  t a r g e t i n g  p o l i c y  c a n  b e  s e e n  t o  be  a  d e s t a b i l i z i n g  f o r c e  i f  
pursued i n  r e s p o n s e  t o  r e a l  demand shocks .  
Supply  shocks  g e n e r a l l y  have b o t h  a  monetary  and a  r e a l  component. For 
example,  t h e  r i s e  i n  t h e  p r i c e  of  impor ted  o i l  d i r e c t l y  r e d u c e s  t h e  r e a l  q u a n t i t y  
of noney s i n c e  i t  r a i s e s  t h e  o v e r a l l  p r i c e  l e v e l .  Th i s  p r i c e  e f f e c t  r a i s e s  i n t e r e s t  
r a t e s  and t e n d s  t o  r e d u c e  n a t i o n a l  income. The r i s e  i n  t h e  p r i c e  of  o i l  a l s o  a c t s  
in much t h e  same manner a s  an i n c r e a s e  i n  e x c i s e  t a x e s .  S i n c e  t h e  s h o r t - r u n  
r e s p o n s i v e n e s s  of  t h e  demand f o r  o i l  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  i t s  p r i c e  i s  known t o  b e  q u i t e  
low, t o t a l  e x p e n d i t u r e s  on o i l  i n c r e a s e .  Th i s  i n c r e a s e  l e a v e s  l e s s  income a v a i l a b l e  
t o  spend on o t h e r  goods and ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  h a s  a  r e s t r i c t i v e  e f f e c t ,  e s p e c i a l l y  b e c a u s e  
a l a r g e  f r a c t i o n  of t h e  payments f o r  o i l  f lows  abroad  and may be  s p e n t  o r  i n v e s t e d  
e l sewhere .  
The t a x  ( income)  e f f e c t  of  a  s u p p l y  shock t e n d s  t o  lower  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  because  
i t  r e d u c e s  a g g r e g a t e  spend ing  i n  r e a l  t e r m s .  The p r i c e  e f f e c t  works  i n  t h e  
o p p o s i t e  d i r e c t i o n  because  i t  lowers  t h e  r e a l  v a l u e  of  t h e  noney s u p p l y .  I f  
t h e  income e f f e c t  i s  dominant ,  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  w i l l  f a l l .  An i n t e r e s t  r a t e  
pegging p o l i c y  t h e n  e x a c e r b a t e s  t h e  d e c l i n e  i n  n a t i o n a l  income s i n c e  i t  i m p l i e s  
a  r e s t r i c t i v e  monetary p o l i c y .  I f  t h e  p r i c e  e f f e c t  d o m i n a t e s ,  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  
r i s e ,  and an i n t e r e s t  r a t e  pegging p o l i c y  t h e n  i m p l i e s  an  e x p a n s i o n a r y  monetary  
p o l i c y  t h a t  c u s h i o n s  t h e  d e c l i n e  i n  income b u t  r i s k s  e x a c e r b a t i n g  t h e  e f f e c t  of 
t h e  shack  on t h e  p r i c e  l e v e l .  
I n t e r e s t  r a t e s  r o s e  s h a r p l y  i n  1974 and 1979 i n  t h e  wake of t h e  two OPEC 
p r i c e  i n c r e a s e s ,  s u g g e s t i n g  t h a t  t h e  F e d e r a l  Rese rve  was f a r  l e s s  concerned  w i t h  
s t a b l e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  t h a n  w i t h  s t e r m i n g  i n f l a t i o n .  However, a s  a  consequence ,  
monetary  p o l i c y  c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  r e s t r i c t i v e  f o r c e s  produced by t h e  o i l  s h o c k s .  
There  i s ,  u n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  no e a s y  d i r e c t i v e  f o r  monetary  p o l i c y  under  t h e  c i rcum- 
s t a n c e s  produced by a  s u p p l y  shock.  Pegging i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  l e a v e s  t h e  outcome up 
t o  c h a n c e ,  depending upon whether  t h e  income o r  t h e  p r i c e  e f f e c t  of t h e  s u p p l y  
shock is dominan t  i n  i n f l u e n c i n g  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  
Under i n f l a t i o n a r y  c o n d i t i o n s  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  t a r g e t i n g  n e c e s s i t a t e s  a  
d e c i s i o n  by t h e  F e d e r a l  Reserve  as t o  whether  i t  i s  r e a l  o r  nominal  r a t e s  
o f  i n t e r e s t  t h a t  shou ld  b e  t a r g e t e d .  I t  i s  r e a l  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  t h a t  d e t e r m i n e  
borrowing and l e n d i n g  d e c i s i o n s  s o  i t  i s  t empt ing  t o  t a r g e t  such r a t e s .  
However, t h e  t a r g e t i n g  o f  r e a l  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  would be  v e r y  dangerous  s i n c e  any 
r e a l  r a t e  o f  i n t e r e s t  i s  c o m p a t i b l e  w i t h  v a s t l y  d i f f e r e n t  i n f l a t i o n  r a t e s .  I f  
a g g r e g a t e  demand i s  e x c e s s i v e  a t  t h e  t a r g e t e d  r e a l  r a t e  o f  i n t e r e s t ,  i t  w i l l  
c o n t i n u e  t o  b e  e x c e s s i v e  as  l o n g  as  t h e  F e d e r a l  Rese rve  p r e v e n t s  t h e  r e a l  r a t e  
o f  i n t e r e s t  from r i s i n g .  Indeed ,  such a  p o l i c y  i m p l i e s  t h a t  t h e  F e d e r a l  Rese rve  
i s  p r e p a r e d  t o  u n d e r w r i t e  any, and a l l ,  i n f l a t i o n  r a t e s .  The t a r g e t i n g  o f  r e a l  
i n t e r e s t  r a t e s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  p r o v i d e s  no p r o t e c t i o n  a g a i n s t  i n f l a t i o n .  
T a r g e t i n g  nominal  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  c r e a t e s  new problems.  I f  such  p o l i c y  i s  
pursued ,  r e a l  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  a r e  t h e n  de te rmined  by t h e  r a t e  o f  i n f l a t i o n ,  a  
h i g h  r a t e  o f  i n f l a t i o n  imply ing  low r e a l  r a t e s  w h i l e  a low r a t e  of  i n f l a t i o n  
i m p l i e s  h i g h  r e a l  r a t e s .  Rut low r e a l  r a t e s  d u r i n g  a  p e r i o d  o f  i n f l a t i o n  s t imu-  
l a t e <  spend ing  and add t o  i n f l a t i o n .  S i m i l a r l y ,  h i g h  r e a l  r a t e s  d u r i n g  a  p e r i o d  
o f  r e l a t i v e  p r i c e  s t a b i l i t y  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  have a  r e s t r i c t i v e  e f f e c t  a t  t h e  wrong 
t ime  b e c a u s e  low i n f l a t i o n  r a t e s  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  o c c u r  d u r i n g  a  p e r i o d  o f  d e p r e s s e d  
economic c o n d i t i o n s .  
I n  c o n c l u s i o n :  The a n a l y s i s  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  t a r g e t i n g  h a s  
fundamental  drawbacks when i t  forms t h e  b a s i s  f o r  t h e  conduc t  monetary  
p o l i c y .  While i t  may b e  t r u e ,  as n o t e d  e a r l i e r ,  t h a t  t h e  absence o f  
such p o l i c y  i n c r e a s e s  t h e  v a r i a b i l i t y  o f  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  and t h e r e f o r e  
adds t o  r i s k  premiums, t h e  e f f e c t  o f  t h i s  on t h e  l e v e l  o f  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  
c o u l d  be  o f f s e t  by a  one-t ime monetary  accommodation. 
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F l u c t u a t i n g  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  a r e  f r e q u e n t l y  c i t e d  a s  c a u s i n g  f l u c t u a t i o n s  
i n  i n t e r e s t - s e n s i t i v e  components o f  a g g r e g a t e  spend ing .  It d o e s  n o t ,  however,  
f o l l o w  t h a t  f i x e d  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  would c o n t r i b u t e  t o  t h e  o v e r a l l  s t a b i l i t y  o f  
t h e  economy. I f  inves tment  demand d e c l i n e s  f o r  some r e a s o n  unconnected t o  
i n t e r e s t  r a t e s ,  n a t i o n a l  income d e c l i n e s  and t h e  demand f o r  money t h e r e f o r e  
a l s o  d e c l i n e s .  I n t e r e s t  r a t e s  t h e r e f o r e  f a l l  and t h i s  h e l p s  t o  c u s h i o n  t h e  
d e c l i n e  i n  i n v e s t m e n t .  Had t h e  F e d e r a l  Reserve pursued a  r e s t r i c t i v e  monetary  
p o l i c y  des igned  t o  p r e v e n t  t h e  d e c l i n e  i n  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s ,  t h e  d e c l i n e  i n  i n v e s t -  
ment would have been more pronounced. It i s  p r e c i s e l y  because  c e r t a i n  expendi-  
t u r e  c a t e g o r i e s  a r e  i n t e r e s t - s e n s i t i v e  t h a t  c a u s e s  f l u c t u a t i n g  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  
t o  be d e s i r a b l e .  I f  no e x p e n d i t u r e  component were i n t e r e s t : s e n s i t i v e ,  t h e n  i t  
would h a r d l y  m a t t e r  what monetary  p o l i c y  does .  
B.  Monetary S u r p r i s e s ,  I n t e r e s t  R a t e s ,  and F e d e r a l  Reserve  T a r g e t s  
S tandard  demand and s u p p l y  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  s u g g e s t  t h a t  a  r i s e  i n  t h e  money 
s u p p l y  s h o u l d  b e  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  a  d e c l i n e  i n  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  As no ted  e a r l i e r ,  
however, t h e  announcement of a n  u n e x p e c t e d l y  l a r g e  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  money s u p p l y  
h a s  f r e q u e n t l y  been a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  a n  immediate r i s e  i n  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  One 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of t h i s  phenomenon i s  t h a t  a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  r a t e  o f  monetary  
growth r a i s e s  t h e  expec ted  r a t e  of i n f l a t i o n .  The h i g h e r  r a t e  of monetary  growth 
t h e r e f o r e  i n c r e a s e s  t h e  s p r e a d  between nominal and r e a l  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s ,  s o  t h a t  
a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  nominal i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  i s  observed .  
T h i s  argument cannot  e x p l a i n  how a  monetary  s u r p r i s e  a f f e c t s  s h o r t - t e r m  
i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  S i n c e  i t  t a k e s  a t  l e a s t  a  y e a r  b e f o r e  a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  r a t e  
o f  monetary  growth h a s  a  d i s c e r n i b l e  e f f e c t  on t h e  i n f l a t i o n  r a t e ,  i n f l a t i o n a r y  
e x p e c t a t i o n s  cannot  e x p l a i n  why s h o r t - t e r m  r a t e s  would respond i n  t h e  manner 
i n d i c a t e d .  
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A more c o n v i n c i n g  e x p l a n a t i o n  l i e s  i n  t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  t h e  F e d e r a l  
R e s e r v e ' s  announced t a r g e t  r a t e s  o f  monetary  growth.  An i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  money 
s t o c k  u n e x p e c t e d l y  above t h e  t a r g e t  may b e  temporary  b e c a u s e  t h e  F e d e r a l  Rese rve  
may be  presumed t o  r e a c t  and r e t u r n  money growth t o  i t s  t a r g e t  p a t h .  Thus,  i f  
w e a l t h  h o l d e r s  b e l i e v e  t h e  money s t o c k  w i l l  d e c l i n e  i n  t h e  f u t u r e ,  t h e y  may a l s o  
b e l i e v e  t h a t  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  w i l l  r i s e .  Such an expec ted  i n c r e a s e  i n  i n t e r e s t  
r a t e s  would i n f l i c t  c a p i t a l  l o s s e s  on bond h o l d e r s .  They t h e r e f o r e  h a s t e n  t o  
s u b s t i t u t e  money f o r  e a r n i n g  a s s e t s ,  c a u s i n g  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  t o  r i s e  immedia te ly .  
I n  an a n a l y s i s  o f  t h i s  phenomenon N i c h o l s ,  Smal l ,  and Webster  - 16/  n o t e  t h a t  
t h e  announcement o f  an u n e x p e c t e d l y  l a r g e  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  money s t o c k  p r o v i d e s  
new i n f o r m a t i o n ,  n o t  new money. The i n t e r e s t  r a t e  r e s p o n s e  t o  t h i s  must t h e n  b e  
a t t r i b u t a b l e  t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  new i n f o r m a t i o n  r a i s e s  t h e  demand f o r  money. I n  
a d d i t i o n ,  and t h i s  i s  c r u c i a l  b u t  f r e q u e n t l y  i g n o r e d ,  t h e  announcement o f  a  change 
i n  t h e  money s t o c k  p r o v i d e s  t h e  same i n f o r m a t i o n  about t h e  demand f o r  money as  
i t s  s u p p l y .  When t h e  money s t o c k  i n c r e a s e s  by an unexpected amount, t h i s  r e v e a l s  
u n a n t i c i p a t e d l y  s t r o n g  demand f o r  money. 
T h i s  i n c r e a s e  i n  demand may be  o n l y  temporary .  I f  i t  mere ly  r e f l e c t s  
a  shock ,  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  t h e  shock w i l l  d i m i n i s h ,  b u t  pe rhaps  o n l y  s l o w l y .  
Meanwhile, however,  i f  t h e  money s t o c k  i s  above t a r g e t ,  t h e  s u p p l y  c o r r e c t i o n  
c o u l d  o c c u r  r a p i d l y  through a c t i o n s  by t h e  F e d e r a l  Rese rve  t o  r e t u r n  t o  a  
t a r g e t  r a t e  o f  mone ta ry  growth.  Consequen t ly ,  i t  i s  expec ted  t h a t  i n  t h e  
n e a r  f u t u r e  t h e  demand f o r  money w i l l  exceed i t s  s u p p l y  and t h a t  i n t e r e s t  
r a t e s  w i l l  r i s e .  The e x p e c t a t i o n  of  h i g h e r  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s ,  implying c a p i t a l  
l o s s e s ,  t h e n  produces  market  r e s p o n s e s  t h a t  r a i s e  t h e  demand f o r  money and l e a d  
t o  an immediate r i s e  i n  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  
161 N i c h o l s ,  D. A . ,  D .  H .  Small  and C .  E .  Webster ,  J r . ,  Why I n t e r e s t  
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R a t e s  R i s e  when an Unexpec ted ly  Large  Xoney Stock i s  Announced. American 
Economic Review, J u n e  1983,  p.  383-388. 
The phenomenon t h a t  r i s i n g  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  accompany u n e x p e c t e d l y  l a r g e  
i n c r e a s e s  i n  t h e  money s u p p l y  i s  of r e c e n t  o r i g i n ,  hav ing  been observed o n l y  
s i n c e  t h e  a d o p t i o n  i n  1975 of H. Con. Res. 133,  which r e q u i r e d  t h e  F e d e r a l  Reserve  
t o  e s t a b l i s h  and announce t a r g e t  r a n g e s  f o r  growth o f  t h e  monetary  a g g r e g a t e s .  
It h a s  been  a c c e n t u a t e d  s i n c e  October  1979 when t h e  monetary  p o l i c i e s  a c t u a l l y  
pursued by t h e  F e d e r a l  Reserve  came i n t o  c l o s e r  c o n f o r m i t y  w i t h  t h e  s p i r i t  of  
t a r g e t i n g  monetary  growth r a t e s .  Evidence i n  s u p p o r t  of t h i s  i s  s u p p l i e d  by 
V. Vance R o l l e y  - 17/  who r e l a t e d  s h o r t - t e r m  y i e l d s  t o  u n a n t i c i p a t e d  changes  i n  
money s t o c k .  The l a t t e r  a r e  c o n s t r u c t e d  from a  weekly s u r v e y  of a b o u t  s i x t y  
money market  p a r t i c i p a n t s .  The a u t h o r  f i n d s  no a s s o c i a t i o n  between i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  
and t h e  expec ted  money s t o c k .  However, h e  d o e s  f i n d  such  a  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between 
i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  and d i s c r e p a n c i e s  between t h e  e c t u a l  and t h e  expec ted  changes  i n  
t h e  money s t o c k .  S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  f o r  t h e  p e r i o d  September 29,  1977 t o  Oc tober  4 ,  
1979 a p o s i t i v e  and s i g n i f i c a n t  a s s o c i a t i o n  i s  found between s h o r t - t e r m  i n t e r e s t  
rates and t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  between t h e  a c t u a l  and t h e  e x p e c t e d  change i n  t h e  money 
s t o c k .  For t h e  p e r i o d  October  11, 1979, t o  J a n u a r y  1, 1980, t h i s  p o s i t i v e  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  becomes a lmos t  e i g h t  t i m e s  s t r o n g e r ,  p r o v i d i n g  s u p p o r t  f o r  t h e  
h y p o t h e s i s  proposed h e r e .  R o l l e y ' s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  i s  similar t o  t h a t  of Nicho ls :  
I f  a n  announcement was h i g h e r  t h a n  e x p e c t e d .  . . t h e  observed  
r i s e  i n  s h o r t - t e r m  y i e l d s  most l i k e l y  r e s u l t e d  from t h e  
m a r k e t ' s  a ssessment  t h a t  t h e  F e d e r a l  Reserve would t r y  t o  
o f f s e t  a t  l e a s t  p a r t  o f  t h e  u n a n t i c i p a t e d  r i s e .  Under t h e  
new monetary  c o n t r o l  p r o c e d u r e s .  . .two f a c t o r s  may c a u s e  i t  
t o  be somewhat l a r g e r  t h a n  b e f o r e .  F i r s t ,  under  t h e  r e s e r v e -  
a g g r e g a t e  approach ,  e x c e s s  demand f o r  r e s e r v e s  a t  a g i v e n  l e v e l  
of money market  y i e l d s  i s  n o t  accommodated by i n c r e a s i n g  non- 
borrowed r e s e r v e s .  Second, i n  c o n j u c t i o n  w i t h  t h e  a d o p t i o n  o f  
t h e  r e s e r v e - a g g r e g a t e  approach ,  t h e  market  may have d e t e c t e d  a  
g r e a t e r  commitment on t h e  p a r t  of t h e  F e d e r a l  Reserve  t o  o f f s e t  
u n a n t i c i p a t e d  f l u c t u a t i o n s  i n  money growth.  18 /  -
171  R o l l e y ,  V .  Vance. The Response of Shor t - term I n t e r e s t  R a t e s  t o  
~ e e k l y ~ o n e ~  Announcements. J o u r n a l  o f  Money, C r e d i t  and Banking,  August 1983,  
p. 344-354. 
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The p e c u l i a r  though u n d e r s t a n d a b l e  r e s u l t  t h a t  a  s h a r p  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  
money s u p p l y  t e n d s  t o  r a i s e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  i n  t h e  s h o r t  r u n  i s  no t  o f  ma jor  
c o n c e r n ,  p rov ided  t h e  changes  a r e  temporary  and do n o t  i n t e r f e r e  w i t h  t h e  conduct  
of  monetary  p o l i c y .  Inasmuch a s  t h e y  a p p e a r  t o  be  caused  by t h e  s o  c a l l e d  
11 r e s e r v e - a g g r e g a t e "  approach ,  i t  i s  i m p o r t a n t  t o  i n v e s t i g a t e  t h e  l a t t e r  q u e s t i o n .  
The problems a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  i n t e r e s t - r a t e  t a r g e t i n g  were  n o t e d  above.  It i s  a l s o  
a p p r o p r i a t e ,  t h e r e f o r e  t o  a s k  whether  t h e  r e s e r v e - a g g r e g a t e  approach i s  
s u b s t a n t i a l l y  s u p e r i o r .  
The m o n e t a r i s t  ph i losophy  which u n d e r l i e s  t h e  r e s e r v e - a g g r e g a t e  approach i s  
t h a t  i t  p r o v i d e s  f o r  o r d e r l y  growth o f  money and c r e d i t  i n  a  way t h a t  f i n a n c e s  economic 
growth a t  s t a b l e  p r i c e s .  Such a  r u l e  d i f f e r s  from i n t e r e s t  r a t e  t a r g e t i n g  i n  
t h a t  i t  p e r m i t s  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  t o  f l u c t u a t e  i n  a  manner t h a t  p r o v i d e s  a cush ion-  
i n g ,  o r  s t a b i l i z i n g  f u n c t i o n .  When t h e  demand f o r  money d e c l i n e s  due t o  a  d e c l i n e  
i n  s p e n d i n g ,  t h e  c o n t i n u a t i o n  of  monetary  growth a t  a  p re -de te rmined  r a t e  c a u s e s  
i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  t o  d e c l i n e  t h e r e b y  c u s h i o n i n g  t h e  d e c l i n e  i n  t h e  economy. 
C o n v e r s e l y ,  when r a p i d l y  r i s i n g  s p e n d i n g  c a u s e s  t h e  demand f o r  money t o  r i s e ,  t h e  
c o n t i n u a t i o n  of s t a b l e  money growth c a u s e s  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  t o  r i s e  t h e r e b y  dampen- 
i n g  t h e  expans ion  of  t h e  economy. Thus,  t h e  r u l e  o f f e r s  t h e  advan tage  o f  a v o i d i n g  
t h e  d e s t a b i l i z i n g  i m p l i c a t i o n s  of  i n t e r e s t - r a t e  t a r g e t i n g .  I t  f a l l s  s h o r t ,  i n  
t h e  e y e s  of a c t i v i s t  e c o n o m i s t s ,  i n  t h a t  i t  i s  a  p a s s i v e  p o s t u r e  t h a t  makes no 
a t t e m p t  t o  u s e  monetary  p o l i c y  t o  o f f s e t  f l u c t u a t i o n s  i n  a g g r e g a t e  spend ing .  
Whether monetary  p o l i c y  shou ld  a t t e m p t  such o f f s e t s  i s  n o t  t h e  i s s u e  h e r e .  
The q u e s t i o n ,  r a t h e r ,  i s  whether  a d o p t i o n  of  t h e  t a r g e t  r a n g e s  p r e s c r i b e d  i n  
l e g i s l a t i o n  nay i n  i t s e l f  i n t e r f e r e  w i t h  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  of  a  s t a b l e  money growth 
r u l e .  The r e a s o n s  f o r  such concern  l i e  i n  t h e  p e r v e r s e  b e h a v i o r  of  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  
i n  r e s p o n s e  t o  u n e x p e c t e d l y  l a r g e  i n c r e a s e s  i n  t h e  money s t o c k .  An example from 
e x p e r i e n c e  i l l u s t r a t e s  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  d i f f i c u l t y .  
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I n  t h e  f i r s t  h a l f  o f  1977 nominal MI grew a t  a  r a t e  of 7.6 p e r c e n t .  That  
r a t e  perked up t o  9.3 p e r c e n t  i n  t h e  t h i r d  q u a r t e r  and t h a t  seemed l i k e  good 
news because  t h e  r e c o v e r y  from t h e  1974-75 r e c e s s i o n  had been d i s a p p o i n t i n g l y  
s low up t o  t h a t  t ime.  However, t h e  a c c e l e r a t i o n  of monetary  growth c o i n c i d e d  
w i t h  a s lowing  i n  t h e  r a t e  of growth o f  v e l o c i t y  o f  MI and a  s h a r p  r i s e  i n  
s h o r t - t e r m  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  Thus, a l t h o u g h  t h e  growth o f  money s u p p l y  a c c e l e r a t e d  
i n  t h e  t h i r d  q u a r t e r ,  t h e  demand f o r  money q u i t e  u n e x p e c t e d l y  a c c e l e r a t e d  even 
more r a p i d l y .  
At t h e  t ime  t h e  t a r g e t  f o r  MI growth was 4  t o  6-112 p e r c e n t .  However, t h e  
a c t u a l  r a t e  of monetary  growth jumped t o  a n  a n n u a l  r a t e  of 12.5  p e r c e n t  i n  J u l y ,  
and i t  t h e n  c o n t i n u e d  a t  a  r a t e  o f  9 .3  p e r c e n t  f o r  t h e  f u l l  t h i r d  q u a r t e r .  Accord- 
i n g  t o  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  p r e s s  t h i s  s h a r p  d i v e r g e n c e  between t h e  a c t u a l  and t h e  t a r g e t  
r a t e s  produced t h e  widespread b e l i e f  t h a t  t h e  F e d e r a l  Reserve would s u b s e q u e n t l y  
squeeze  down t h e  r a t e  of monetary  growth i n  o r d e r  t o  g e t  back  on t a r g e t .  Indeed ,  
F e d e r a l  Reserve Chairman Ar thur  Burns '  o f t  r e p e a t e d  s t a t e m e n t s  t h a t  monetary  growth 
r a t e s  had been e x c e s s i v e  a l l  a l o n g ,  and h i s  f r e q u e n t  i n t i m a t i o n s  t h a t  i t  might  be 
n e c e s s a r y  f o r  t h e  Fed t o  i n t e r v e n e  i n  t h e  fore ign-exchange market  t o  p r e s e r v e  
what h e  termed t h e  " i n t e g r i t y  of t h e  d o l l a r , "  s e r v e d  t o  i n t e n s i f y  t h i s  e x p e c t a t i o n .  
The a n t i c i p a t i o n  of a n  impending monetary  c runch  produced a n  u n l o a d i n g  of 
v a r i o u s  s h o r t - t e r m  f i n a n c i a l  a s s e t s  i n  f a v o r  of c a s h  b a l a n c e s .  The consequence 
o f  t h i s  i n c r e a s e  i n  l i q u i d i t y  p r e f e r e n c e  was a  slowdown i n  t h e  r a t e  o f  v e l o c i t y  
growth combined w i t h  a v e r y  s t e e p  r ise  i n  s h o r t - t e r m  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  
If t h i s  d i a g n o s i s  i s  c o r r e c t ,  i t  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  monetary  p o l i c y  might  have 
been i n  t h e  p r o c e s s  of s h o r t - c i r c u i t i n g  i t s e l f  i n  a  way t h a t  t h r e a t e n e d  t o  make 
f o r  p e r e n n i a l  monetary  r e s t r i c t i o n .  Because of t h e  low t a r g e t  r ange  and t h e  
e x p e c t a t i o n s  c r e a t e d  by a n  a b o v e - t a r g e t  r a t e  of monetary  growth,  t h e  f a s t e r  r a t e  of 
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growth,  r a t h e r  t h a n  l o w e r i n g  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  and f o s t e r i n g  economic e x p a n s i o n ,  
caused  t h e  demand f o r  money t o  i n c r e a s e  f o r  p o r t f o l i o  r e a s o n s .  Thus, t h e  
econonly was u n a b l e  t o  e n j o y  t h e  b e n e f i t s  o f  f a s t e r  monetary  growth.  C o n v e r s e l y ,  
i t  was i m p o s s i b l e  t o  r a i s e  t h e  t a r g e t  r a n g e s  t o  accommodate a  h i g h e r  r a t e  o f  
monetary  growth b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  p e r v a s i v e  f e a r  t h a t  any such a c t i o n  h e r a l d e d  a 
weakening i n  t h e  F e d e r a l  R e s e r v e ' s  r e s o l v e  t o  combat i n f l a t i o n .  I t  would a p p e a r ,  
t h e n ,  t h a t  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  t a r g e t  r a n g e s  f o r  monetary  p o l i c y  produces  a  
p o t e n t i a l l y  s e v e r e  t e c h n i c a l  problem t h a t  h a s  y e t  t o  b e  r e s o l v e d .  
C .  Changing t h e  Monetary-Fiscal  Mix 
High i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  a r e  a  p r imary  r e a s o n  f o r  p r e s s u r e  t o  r educe  t h e  budget  
d e f i c i t .  I n  many c a s e s  demands f o r  d e f i c i t  r e d u c t i o n  a r e  framed on t h e  d o u b t f u l  
p remise  t h a t  d e f i c i t  r e d u c t i o n  a lone  i s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  p r o v i d e  f o r  s u s t a i n e d  economic 
r e c o v e r y .  A s  n o t e d  e a r l i e r ,  such arguments may b e  v a l i d  i n  t h e  longer - run  i f  
t h e y  r e f e r  t o  t h e  danger  o f  s u p p l y  b o t t l e n e c k s  caused  by i n a d e q u a t e  c a p i t a l  
spend ing .  F r e q u e n t l y ,  however,  t h e y  a r e  pu t  forward i n  a  manner which s u g g e s t s  
t h a t  r e c o v e r y  w i l l  b e  abor ted  b e c a u s e  of  t h e  adverse  e f f e c t s  o f  r i s i n g  i n t e r e s t  
r a t e s  on a g g r e g a t e  demand. 
Arguments which make t h e  c l a i m  t h a t  a  d e f i c i t - r e d u c i n g  p o l i c y  such as a 
t a x  i n c r e a s e  i s  needed t o  e n s u r e  r e c o v e r y  g e n e r a l l y  emphasize t h e  f a v o r a b l e  
spend ing  e f f e c t s  t h a t  would b e  caused  by a  d e c l i n e  i n  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  w h i l e  
i g n o r i n g  t h e  u n f a v o r a b l e  spend ing  e f f e c t s  o f  t h e  p o l i c i e s  t h a t  a r e  r e s p o n s i b l e  
f o r  t h e  d e c l i n e  i n  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  An income t a x  i n c r e a s e ,  f o r  example,  
lowers  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  because  i t  r e d u c e s  consumer spend ing .  T h i s  d e c l i n e  
i n  spend ing  r e d u c e s  t h e  q u a n t i t y  o f  money demanded t h e r e b y  lower ing  i n t e r e s t  
r a t e s .  The lower  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  t h e n  improve o t h e r  components of  spend ing  
such as  inves tment  and n e t  e x p o r t s .  But t h e s e  i n c r e a s e s  must b e  l e s s  than  t h e  
CRS -47 
But t h e s e  i n c r e a s e s  must  b e  l e s s  t h a n  t h e  r e d u c t i o n  i n  consumption s p e n d i n g  s i n c e  
o t h e r w i s e  t o t a l  spend ing  would be  h i g h e r .  I n t e r e s t  r a t e s  c o u l d  t h e r e f o r e  n o t  
have  f a l l e n  and i n v e s t m e n t  and n e t  e x p o r t s  c o u l d  n o t ,  t h e n ,  have  improved.  A 
t a x  i n c r e a s e  c a n n o t ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  promote r e c o v e r y .  What i t  can do  i s  t o  change 
t h e  c h a r a c t e r  o f  t h e  r e c o v e r y ,  moving a g g r e g a t e  spend ing  away from consumption 
towards  t h e  components of e x p e n d i t u r e  t h a t  respond t o  lower i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  
A t a x  i n c r e a s e  lowers  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  by  r e d u c i n g  t h e  demand f o r  money and 
c r e d i t .  During a  p e r i o d  o f  s l a c k  i n  t h e  economy i t  would be f a r  Kore a p p r o p r i a t e  
t o  b r i n g  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  down by i n c r e a s i n g  t h e  s u p p l y  of  money and c r e d i t  r a t h e r  
t h a n  c u r t a i l i n g  i t s  demand. Consequen t ly ,  a s  long  a s  unemployment r emains  h i g h ,  
a  more a p p r o p r i a t e  p o l i c y  would a p p e a r  t o  b e  a n  e x p a n s i o n a r y  uionetary p o l i c y .  
C r i t i c s  of  t h i s  approach a r g u e  t h a t  such p o l i c y  would b e  i n f l a t i o n a r y .  To some 
e x t e n t  t h a t  i s ,  of  c o u r s e ,  t r u e ;  e x p a n s i o n a r y  p o l i c i e s  g e n e r a l l y  do c a r r y  w i t h  
them t h e  r i s k  of more i n f l a t i o n .  keducing t h e  d e f i c i t  does  n o t  c a r r y  w i t h  i t  
t h i s  r i s k  b e c a u s e  i t  i s  no t  a n  e x p a n s i o n a r y  p o l i c y .  
R e s t r i c t i v e  f i s c a l  p o l i c y  w i l l  h e l p  t o  r e d u c e  o b s t a c l e s  t h a t  a r e  c u r r e n t l y  
impeding i n t e r e s t - s e n s i t i v e  spend ing .  It w i l l ,  however,  h a v e  a n e t  r e s t r i c t i v e  
e f f e c t  on t h e  economy. To make s u r e  t h a t  demand i s  s u f f i c i e n t ,  combining t h e  
r e s t r i c t i v e  f i s c a l  p o l i c y  w i t h  an  e x p a n s i o n a r y  monetary  p o l i c y  s h o u l d  be  c o n s i d e r e d .  
Although model s i m u l a t i o n s  a r e  o n l y  s u g g e s t i v e ,  i t  i s  i n s t r u c t i v e  t o  e s t i m a t e  
t h e  e f f e c t s  of  a  change i n  t h e  p o l i c y  mix by u s e  of a n  e c o n o a e t r i c  model o f  t h e  economy. 
F i r s t ,  t h e  p a t h  of t h e  econoKy i s  s i m u l a t e d  w i t h  unchanged f i s c a l  and monetary  p o l i c i e s .  
T h i s  b a s e - l i n e ,  o r  c o n t r o l ,  s o l u t i o n  i s  t h e n  compared w i t h  t h e  p a t h  i m p l i e d  by t h e  
changed p o l i c i e s  and t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  a r e  o b s e r v e d .  A r e c e n t  s t u d y  of  t h i s  s o r t  was 
conducted by Roger Br inner  u s ing  t h e  Data  Resources (DRI) model of t h e  economy. 191 -
I n  t h e  D R I  b a s e l i n e ,  t h e  s t r u c t u r a l  d e f i c i t  i s  p r o j e c t e d  t o  be $125 b i l l i o n  
i n  c a l e n d a r  yea r  1984. It r i s e s  t o  $191 b i l . l i o n  i n  1987 and t o  $275 b i l l i o n  i n  
1990. These r i s i n g  d e f i c i t s ,  combined wi th  a  r ecove r ing  economy and on ly  modest 
monetary growth, produce t h e  expected r e s u l t  o f  h i g h e r  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  The 
Fede ra l  Funds r a t e  r i s e s  from 8.9 pe rcen t  i n  1984 t o  11 .2  percent  i n  1986, whi le  
t h e  c o r p o r a t e  bond r a t e  r i s e s  from 11.2 t o  13 .4  pe rcen t .  F u r t h e r  i n c r e a s e s  i n  
bo th  s h o r t  and long-term r a t e s  a r e  p r o j e c t e d  f o r  t he  pe r iod  1987-1990. 
The f i s c a l  package cons ide red  i n  t h e  s imu la t ion  uses  a  combinat ion o f  t a x  
i n c r e a s e s  and expend i tu re  r e d u c t i o n s  t h a t  reduce t h e s e  s t r u c  t u r  a1 d e f i c i t s  by 
$7, $135, and $237 b i l l i o n  i n  1984, 1987, and 1990 r e s p e c t i v e l y .  Th i s  i s  com- 
bined wi th  a  s l i g h t l y  more r a p i d  r a t e  o f  monetary growth. The growth of  non- 
borrowed r e s e r v e s ,  which i s  t h e  d r i v i n g  monetary p o l i c y  v a r i a b l e  i n  t h e  D R I  model, 
i s  r a i s e d  by 0 .5  pe rcen tage  p o i n t s  i n  1984. I t  i s  r a i s e d  1.2 percentage  p o i n t s  
ove r  t he  b a s e l i n e  i n  1985 and 0 .8  percent  i n  1986. 
According t o  t h e  D R I  model, t h e s e  changes would produce h i g h l y  s a l u t a r y  e f f e c t s  
on i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  I n s t e a d  of  an upward t r a j e c t o r y ,  t h e  r a t e s  e x h i b i t  a  d e c l i n i n g  
t r e n d .  The Fede ra l  Funds r a t e  would drop  0 .4  percentage  p o i n t s  i n  1984, 1 . 8  pe rcen t  
i n  1985 and 3.5 pe rcen t  i n  1986. The c o r p o r a t e  bond r a t e  would d e c l i n e  0 . 8  pe rcen t  
i n  1984, and 2.2 and 3.7 percent  i n  1985 and 1986 r e s p e c t i v e l y .  
The model s i m u l a t i o n  a l s o  sugges t s  t h a t  t h i s  change i n  t h e  p o l i c y  mix, which 
r e q u i r e s  heavy doses of  f i s c  a1 r e s t r a i n t  combined wi th  moderate monetary acce l e ra -  
t i o n ,  would slow t h e  growth of  r e a l  GNP between now and 1987, b u t  never  by more 
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than  0.7 pe rcen tage  p o i n t s  a  yea r .  The change i n  t h e  composi t ion of f i n a l  
demand would b e  as expec t ed .  Nonresident  i a1 f i x e d  investment  would r i s e  
modera te ly  i n  1985 and 1986, bu t  t hen  p ick  up q u i t e  s h a r p l y  f o r  an average 
annual g a i n  of  5 .7  pe rcen t  i n  t h e  1987-90 pe r iod .  Housing would be tremendously 
b e n e f i t t e d ,  g a i n i n g  as much as 18.2 percent  over  t h e  b a s e l i n e  by 1987, and n e t  
e x p o r t s  a l s o  would i n c r e a s e  modera te ly  i n  response  t o  a s l i g h t l y  weaker d o l l a r .  
These ga ins  would come a t  t h e  expense o f  consumption and Fede ra l  purchases .  
The model s i m u l a t i o n  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  i n i t i a l l y  t h e r e  would be v i r t u a l l y  
no e f f e c t  on t h e  i n f l a t i o n  r a t e .  However, because o f  g r e a t e r  inves tment ,  
p r o d u c t i v i t y  growth would improve, and t h e r e  would be ,  t hen ,  s i g n i f i c a n t  
i n f l a t i o n  g a i n s  commencing i n  1987. For t h e  pe r iod  1987-1990 t h e  consumer 
p r i c e  index would average 0.6 pe rcen t  l e s s  t han  i n  t h e  base - l i ne  s o l u t i o n  
and t h e  d e f l a t o r  f o r  GNP would be  0 . 2  pe rcen t  lower.  
I n  summary: The model sugges t s  t h a t  t h e  change i n  t h e  p o l i c y  mix could  
produce a  number of s i g n i f i c a n t  e f f e c t s .  C a p i t a l  spending,  hous ing ,  and n e t  
expor t s  would i n c r e a s e  whi le  t h e  consumption and government s h a r e s  of GNP would 
d e c l i n e .  Short: and long-term i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  would d e c l i n e .  Because i n t e r e s t  
r a t e s  would be  lower,  t h e  d o l l a r  would be somewhat weaker. The f a l l  i n  i n t e r e s t  
r a t e s  and i n  t h e  va lue  o f  t h e  d o l l a r  h e l p  t h e  g l o b a l  economy by e a s i n g  t h e  LDC 
deb t  problem and p e r m i t t i n g  f o r e i g n  c o u n t r i e s  t o  s t i m u l a t e  t h e i r  economies. 
Domestic a l l y ,  manufactur ing would expand more r a p i d l y  because of  t he  s h i f t  i n  
f i n a l  demand. And i n f l a t i o n  would a l s o  be reduced because  of lower c a p i t  a1 c o s t s  
and s t r o n g e r  p r o d u c t i v i t y  growth i n  t h e  longe r  run.  
